









































MSc by Research Philosophy 

















Answering questions about personal identity requires us to make certain judgements 
concerning what a person is, such that he or she can persist through time, but these 
judgements often hide assumptions that affect the way our assessment operates. When 
discussing personal identity, the way we take the mind to be has significant effect on how we 
characterise persons and the importance we place on identity. So what is it we care about 
when we are concerned about the future of our own person? 
 Of the obvious candidates psychological continuity or similarity has been, in general, 
the preferred option. For someone to be one and the same person over time Y today must have 
some of the beliefs, desires, intentions and memories that X had yesterday, as well as some 
memories of the events that happened to X yesterday. The psychological continuity account is 
thus a development of Locke’s memory criterion. It has been developed by, among others, 
Derek Parfit who argues that personal identity is psychological continuity with the right kind 
of cause (Relation R) obtaining uniquely, his formula being: 
PI = Relation R + uniqueness. 
Uniqueness is an addition which allows identity to be differentiated from survival thus 
dealing with the problem scenario of reduplication or branching
1
. Whilst an individual being 
the same person over time depends on whether any other individual exists who can also claim 
to be the same person, I can survive even though I am not the only individual who is 
                                                 
1
 I will use reduplication, duplication and branching interchangeably throughout my dissertation to 
mean the same process: a qualitatively identical copy being produced. 
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psychologically continuous with a person existing at an earlier time. To survive is just to be 
psychologically continuous with an earlier individual. 
For Parfit, psychological continuity must have the right kind of cause, which ensures 
that both survival and personal identity require more than mere psychological similarity 
between two individuals for the relation of survival or identity to hold. Since survival is a 
one-many relation it can withstand reduplication. Parfit’s response to the problem of 
reduplication is to deny that any account of personal identity can avoid the problem. 
However, he suggests, since survival is not affected by this problem, we should concern 
ourselves with survival, and not with personal identity. 
 In my dissertation I will question the merit of Parfit’s formulation of personal 
identity. Specifically, I will examine various ways in which a psychological account of 
personal identity, similar to that of Parfit, might avoid the possibility of reduplication. In 
chapter one I will present the psychological account of personal identity and Parfit’s reasons 
for preferring survival to identity. In the next chapter I will examine a criticism made against 
Parfit concerning causality, which will introduce externalism about mental content, the topic 
of the third chapter. After attempting to avoid the problem of reduplication by invoking 
arguments for externalism about content, I will examine another option: active externalism, or 
vehicle externalism as it is sometimes called. The fifth chapter will then focus on 
embodiment, a last attempt to avoid reduplication without ditching psychological continuity 
as our criterion of personal identity. The motivation for exploring embedded and embodied 
approaches to cognition is that they cast doubt on the easy separation of brain and body which 
is often taken for granted in the identity literature. 
 In chapter three it will become clear that, whilst accepting an externalist position 
about mental content casts doubt on the possibility of psychological similarity without a 
causal connection between two person-stages, cases of reduplication are unaffected by the 
debate about wide and narrow content. 
 Discussion in chapter four and five takes a similar vein, as I try to establish a stronger 
notion of psychological continuity, based on the consequences of a view of the mind as 
embodied and embedded in an environment. Such a view reviews standard conceptions of the 
relation between mind and body as relatively inconsequential. The claim is not that body and 
brain interact at a basic level, but that cognitive processing incorporates body and 
environment in such a way that the mind should be understood as a larger system of which the 
brain is just a part. With this in mind, the simple assumptions by which brains are imagined to 
be transplanted into new bodies, and agents are said to be teletransported to new 
 3 
environments should be reviewed. Whilst embodiment provides us with some reasons to re-
evaluate our understanding of brain transplant thought experiments, we will see that the 
nature of teletransportation is consistent with the mind as both extended and embodied. 
The Extended Mind Hypothesis and theories about embodiment offer a new, if 












































My target in this paper is an account of personal identity according to which being one and 
the same person over time involves exhibiting nothing but psychological continuity over time, 
where this psychological continuity is thought to be separable from any sort of bodily 
continuity. As such a prime object of deliberation will be Derek Parfit’s account in Reasons 
and Persons
2
, but I do not intend my arguments to be restricted to Parfit’s position. My 
remarks serve as a critique of any psychological account according to which similarity of 
beliefs, desires, intentions and memories, in conjunction with a causal connection, is 
sufficient for personal identity. I will make reference to Sydney Shoemaker’s work also, but, 
since Parfit’s Reasons and Persons furnishes us with the most thorough psychological 
account yet, my remarks will mostly revolve around claims made in his book. Moreover, 
Parfit’s further claims about what he calls ‘survival’ give us a further reason to try to adapt his 
account of psychological continuity so that it will not be subject to reduplication. 
 In this chapter I will present the psychological account of personal identity, and 
explain why Parfit thinks his account of survival is of more philosophical significance than a 
corresponding account of personal identity. The difference between survival and personal 
identity is merely that in the case of the former I can survive as many individuals, whereas 
personal identity is a one-one relation – I can only be identical with one future person. 
                                                 
2
 Parfit, Derek 1987: Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
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 It is this difference that motivates the direction of my discussion: if we can strengthen 
the criterion of personal identity so that it will not succumb to the possibility of duplication, 
then we lose sight of the reason for preferring survival to personal identity. 
 
 
1.1) The Problem of Personal Identity 
The problem of personal identity is rooted in the problem of change – an issue for all 
kinds of theories of identity. Our question concerns how an object can stay the same and yet 
be subject to change. This problem is further exacerbated by the difficulty philosophers have 
had in agreeing about what a person is. The tomato is both green and red; the leaves on the 
tree are both green and brown. All natural objects seem to undergo change, including persons. 
Yet whilst a leaf or a tomato are perhaps easily characterised, defining a person is not so 
simple. 
 By examining change we are interested in identity over time, or diachronic identity. 
Although the instantiation of multiple properties at a time is also of issue in matters of 
identity, change takes place over time. Our problem concerns one object at time t1 being the 
same as an object at t2 despite the properties of the object altering between t1 and t2. 
Another distinction to be made is between quantitative and qualitative identity. Two 
objects may be qualitatively identical, for example two 30cm rulers may be qualitatively 
identical because they were made in the same factory, from the same mould and from the 
same kind of plastic. However, they are not quantitatively, or numerically, identical. On the 
other hand, one object may have a different structure, or be made of different materials at 
different times, but that does not mean it is not one and the same object over the period. A 
seedling is the same as the plant it grows into even though they are of different sizes at 
different times. This is an example of an object changing whilst still retaining its identity. 
What interests us in discussions of personal identity is primarily quantitative identity, 
although dramatic changes in qualitative identity may tempt us to claim that quantitative 
identity has been lost. For example if a political party changes its policies and positions so 
radically that it is unrecognisable as the party of old, the party-after-doctrinal-change will be 
given a moniker that differentiates it from the party-before-the-change. Nevertheless, we still 
think of the party as numerically the same even if we no longer agree with its policies and 
refuse to vote for it in an election. 
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 Before I move on to discuss the nature of the problem of change for accounts of 
personal identity, it should also be mentioned that identity is an equivalence relation, meaning 
the identity relation must satisfy three necessary conditions: transitivity, symmetry and 
reflexivity. 
• Transitivity states that if a bears relation I to b, and b bears I to c, then a must also bear 
I to c. So if a is identical to b, and b is identical to c, then a and c are also identical. 
• For symmetry to hold if a is I related to b, then b is I related to a in the same way. If a is 
identical to b, then b is identical to a. 
• Lastly, a relation is reflexive if an object bears the relation to itself, in other words 
object a is identical to itself. 
 For any object to be one and the same thing over time it must conform to these three 
conditions. 
The significance of change in discussions of personal identity is illustrated by the 
puzzle of the Ship of Theseus
3
. The story goes that the ship sets sail and does not return to 
port for, let’s say, twenty years. In that time all the different parts of the ship age and must be 
replaced. Since they are at sea the crew can only make alterations one at a time. First one 
plank is replaced with a new one, then another. Each time the new piece of wood is brought to 
the ship by another vessel and the discarded piece taken away by the same means. When the 
ship returns to dock twenty years later it is not constituted by a single piece of the original 
wood and other materials, but by new materials. The dilemma we are left with is whether this 
is still the Ship of Theseus
4
. 
A similar change happens in human beings – over a period of around fifteen years 
every cell in the human body, excepting some parts of the brain such as the cortex, is 
replaced
5
. So me-sixteen-years-ago has no biological bodily matter in common with me-
today.  This is a more radical kind of change than a change in colour, for example. If we want 
to claim that personal identity just is having the same body we may have to narrow our focus 
to the brain. How can it be that personal identity is bodily continuity if our bodies, barring our 
brains, are composed of completely different matter several times over in one lifetime? 
                                                 
3
 Plutarch 1960: The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek lives, trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert, London: 
Penguin, Theseus: 23, p. 28-9 
4
 A further question arises if we imagine that someone has collected together all the rejected planks 
from the original ship and rebuilt a vessel with them. Now we have two contenders for the title of Ship 
of Theseus. This problem is analogous to the problem of fission in psychological accounts of personal 
identity, as we shall see. 
5
 Vince, Gaia 2006: ‘Your amazing regenerating body’ in New Scientist: 2556: 
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/health/mg19025561.900-your-amazing-regenerating-
body.html;jsessionid=LCFBOAFLMDKE, accessed 03.08.2007 
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One answer will be that bodily continuity does not require us to be composed of 
exactly the same body cells. And in fact bodily continuity does not require this. Over the 
course of twenty years many of the faculty in a philosophy department will change, however 
that does not mean that at any point the department ceases to exist. Nevertheless, we must still 
explain how identity is retained in the face of dramatic changes in the composition of an 
object. 
The four-dimensionalist (or perdurantist) position on the identity of an object 
withstanding (physical) change is that we should take objects to be space-time worms, the 
mereological sums of temporal stages. Thus, for one object to persist through time is for it to 
be constituted by a series of momentary stages
6
. For my current person-stage to be of the 
same person as a person-stage that existed yesterday the two stages must form a mereological 
sum with all the other person-stages of that person. Persons are thus long-lived things, but at 
any one time only a stage of that person exists. Thus the four-dimensionalist can easily 
account for change. Rather than claiming that change is something that happens to one 
particular enduring object, change for the four-dimensionalist is a relation between two 
different stages
7
. When the fruit on the tomato plant changes from green to red as it ripens, 
there are a number of earlier tomato-stages that are green, followed by a number of later 
tomato-stages that are red
8
. In this way it is the tomato that changes because a number of its 
stages exhibit different colours. 
A benefit of this view is that it allows us to formulate questions about personal 
identity explicitly. If we apply the four dimensionalist’s theory to the case of persons we can 
have a series of person-stages, the sum of which is the person in question. When a finger is 
amputated there will be a person-stage prior to amputation which has ten fingers, and one 
post-amputation with only nine fingers. We do not lose identity in this case, because the 
person is constituted by the sum of its various person-stages. As long as the person-stages are 
connected in a suitable way, then we have no particular problem with change and person 
identity. The question, of course, remains: what is a suitable relation of connection between 
person-stages? We cannot claim that stages are suitably connected if they belong to the same 
person, for it is the reason for this belonging that is in question. So whilst four-
dimensionalism enables us to structure questions about identity clearly, we are still looking 
for the criterion of personal identity. 
 
                                                 
6
 Sider, Theodore 1996: ‘All the World’s a Stage’ in Australian Journal of Philosophy, 74:3: p. 433 
7
 Hawley, Katherine 2004: How Things Persist, Oxford: OUP, pp. 11-12 
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1.2) Physical Theories 
Bodily continuity has appealed to some as a possible criterion for personal identity, 
and has some intuitive interest for us. But, in the place of bodily continuity, the standard 
conception of personal identity holds that psychology is what is significant to being one and 
the same person. The latter and more recent view is often coincident with some sort of bodily 
continuity, for example continuity of the brain, but it is not necessarily so. Even when 
psychological continuity does not require physical continuity of any kind, real world 
instantiations of psychological continuity seem to coincide with physical continuity. Actual 
cases of two person-stages being psychological continuous involve, at the very least, brain 
continuity if not body continuity. 
 Parfit begins his discussion of personal identity in Reasons and Persons by 
considering the branch-line case
9
. We are asked to imagine that teletransportation is normally 
a reliable method of transport to distant places, including Mars. On his usual commute to 
work on Mars Derek goes to the teletransportation device, presses a button and a copy of his 
mind and body is recorded and transmitted to a similar device on Mars. As this happens his 
body on Earth is destroyed and a replica (Replica), made of similar matter, is formed on Mars 
from the information encoded in the transmission. As far as his experience goes, he loses 
consciousness for a few seconds, and when he wakes up he is on Mars with a body that 
matches the one he had on Earth a few seconds ago exactly. He can remember what he had 
for breakfast that morning, how to drive a car and the date of the Battle of Hastings. The aim 
of the experiment is to persuade us that teletransportation is as good as other means of 
transport. I maintain my identity when I take a train from Edinburgh to London. So too, Parfit 
wants us to say, do I maintain my identity when I teletransport from Earth to Mars. 
 The thought experiment is supposed to tell us something about the nature of personal 
identity. If it can survive teletransportation then it seems psychological continuity is more 
important than physical continuity. Derek’s body on Mars is similar to his body on Earth, but 
it is only made out of the same sort of stuff as he was on Earth. There is no direct continuity 
between his body on Earth and his body on Mars. However, unless we identify mental states 
with specific brain states, then we can think of his mind as existing on Earth at one time and 
later on Mars, despite the difference in physical matter. And there is a causal connection 
                                                 
9
 Parfit 1987, pp. 199-200 
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between his mind on Earth and his mind on Mars. The existence of the mental states of the 
replica on Mars is due to the information encoded in the transmission device, which in turn is 
caused by Derek’s mental states on Earth. 
 Another thought experiment is intended to give an even clearer example of personal 
identity holding in a situation in which there is no (or at least little) physical continuity. 
Sydney Shoemaker asks us to imagine that two men, Brown and Robinson, undergo surgery 
which requires the brain to be removed before being replaced in the body
10
. However due to a 
rather unfortunate mix up, Brown’s brain is placed in the body of Robinson. The resulting 
person, which Shoemaker calls Brownson, has the body of Robinson, but the brain of Brown. 
If we suppose for now that by transplanting the brain we also transplant the mind, then it 
would seem that Brownson has all the psychological features of Brown, whilst inhabiting 
Robinson’s body. Intuition does suggest that when Brownson regains consciousness he will 
remember Brown’s memories, will have Brown’s intentions to go home and have dinner with 
Brown’s wife and after recuperation go back to work in Brown’s job. He will also be 
perplexed that he is now five inches taller than he was yesterday, that his hair has changed 
colour and that he now wears glasses. It is difficult, Shoemaker tells us, to resist the view that 
Brownson is Brown, albeit with a different physical shape. The conclusion we are inclined to 
make is that psychology is more important to us than our particular physical persistence. 
Specifically, Shoemaker suggests that since Brownson has memories of being Brown, we 






 In 1694 in the second edition of An Essay concerning Human Understanding
12
, John 
Locke made a similar suggestion for a suitable criterion for personal identity: to be one and 
the same person is to have the memories of events that befell the earlier person. Roughly 
known as the memory criterion there is prima facie appeal to it – our way of knowing that we 
are one and same over time seems to rely on memory. It is my memories of previous events 
that convince me that I do persist in time, as it is memory that allows me to relate and equate 
beliefs I have held in the past with beliefs I hold now. If we wanted to maintain that bodily 
continuity is significant in personal identity, from the first person perspective it would be 
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 Shoemkaer, Sydney & Swinburne, Richard 1984: Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 78-9 
11
 Shoemaker & Swinburne, 1984, p. 78 
12
 Locke, John 1979: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: OUP 
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memory that enabled me to compare my body now with my body in the past. However this is 
a matter of how it is I come to know that I am the same person over time, rather than what 
actually ensures that personal identity holds – can memory do the work for the metaphysical 
fact as well as the epistemological one? 
 Locke argues that what matters in identity is uniformity of consciousness, in other 
words, that our capacity to remember previous events makes us one and the same person
13
. 
Thomas Reid objected to the memory criterion claiming it leads to an inconsistency. We can 
imagine an elderly professor who can remember his exploits as a student at university, but 
cannot remember being a young boy who gets a detention for cheating in a test
14
. The student 
did, however, remember his boyhood and the shameful incident. Identity is a transitive 
relationship, so since the professor remembers being a student, and the student remembers 
being a boy, then, according to the memory criterion, the professor is the same person as the 
boy. However, the professor does not have any recollection of being punished for cheating at 
the test as a boy, so, again given our memory criterion, we will also be inclined to say that he 
is not the same person. 
 In response to the allegation made by Reid, a supporter of the memory criterion can 
alter his account – it is not necessary that one remembers all the events that one has 
experienced, but what is needed is continuity of memory. For the professor to be the same 
person as the boy there must be a chain of “memory-connected person-stages”
15
. This is the 
most basic formulation of psychological continuity. What is needed for personal identity is 
merely a matter of memory, but all that is required is a chain of causal memory connections 
and not a complete store of memories of every event experienced. So our account of personal 
identity thus far goes: 
Personal Identity obtains when each person-stage is connected by strong similarity 
between the memories of the latter and the events that have happened to the former. 
  
 Another problem for the memory criterion is that it has the appearance of circularity. 
When I define personal identity in terms of memory I am then left with the problem of 
defining memory. Memory would seem itself to be defined in terms of personal identity – I 
can remember certain experiences because they are experiences that happened to me, in other 
words, because I am the same person as the person who experienced those events. I will 
return to this problem once I have expanded on the kind of continuity that we need for a 
criterion of personal identity. 
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 Locke 1979, II: XXVII: §9, p. 335 
14
 For a discussion of Reid’s objection see Shoemaker & Swinburne 1984, pp. 80-81 
15
 Shoemaker & Swinburne 1984, p. 81 
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1.4) Psychological Continuity 
To claim persons are constituted by memories alone imposes strong restrictions on 
what it is to be a person. The expansion from memory continuity to psychological continuity, 
involving other mental states, seems to be instigated by the possibility of amnesia. Shoemaker 
imagines that a person has amnesia about the events from his or her past, but claims this 
would not make this individual a different person post-amnesia to the person that existed 
before the memory-loss occurred
16
. It seems there is a lot more to being a person than 
memory – for example we often consider ourselves to have character traits, ongoing interests 
and beliefs and intentions about what we will do in the future
17
. Thus, there are other elements 
that are involved in personal identity. Being one and the same person may involve a more 
general psychological continuity: continuity of beliefs, intentions and desires also. In fact, it is 
unclear that if an individual was to suffer amnesia that they would continue to have the same 
beliefs, desires and intentions. Nevertheless, Shoemaker’s point stands that personal identity 
does not consist in memories alone. We can characterise our new notion of personal identity 
thus: 
Personal Identity is the holding of a chain of psychological connections between 
person stages, involving beliefs, desires, intentions and memories. 
  
 Our new account seems to satisfy the amnesia case where a person loses all their 
autobiographical memory (memory of their personal history) but still has many other 
psychological states in common with his or her former self. However, some other changes are 
also necessary. Parfit’s psychological criterion is stated as follows: 
“(1) There is psychological continuity if and only if there are overlapping chains of 
strong connectedness. X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time if 
and only if (2) X is psychologically continuous with Y, (3) this continuity has the 
right kind of cause, and (4) it has not taken a ‘branching’ form. (5) Personal identity 




For Parfit two person-stages are strongly psychologically connected if they have at least half 
of the same psychological states in common
19
. However, psychological connectedness itself is 
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 Shoemaker & Swinburne 1984, p. 87-88 
17
 Shoemaker & Swinburne 1984, p. 87 
18
 Parfit 1987, p. 207 
19
 Parfit does not explain the necessity of having at least half of the same psychological states in 
common with a previous person-stage. The claim seems to be an arbitrary one, and it is unclear why he 
should not simply state that there must be enough psychological states in common, leaving it as an 
open empirical question as to how many states will constitute enough. 
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not sufficient for personal identity because identity is a transitive relation, whilst 
connectedness is not. I can be connected to myself yesterday, but not at all to myself five 
years ago. Personal identity is thus psychological continuity – all of my person-stages are 
continuous with one another because they are all linked by a chain of connectedness. I can 
compare any of my person-stages and what makes them all my person-stages is that they all 




The causal relation between person-stages plays a significant role in the psychological 
account, because it is the existence, or lack thereof, of the causal relation that allows us to 
differentiate between psychological continuity and mere similarity. I can be psychologically 
similar to my sister because we have similar genes and a similar upbringing, but that does not 
mean that me-today is a person-stage belonging to the same person as the person-stage that is 
my-sister-twenty-years-ago. What makes my person-stages psychologically continuous is the 
causal relation between the experiences, beliefs, intentions and desires each of my past 
person-stages had, and the memories, beliefs, desires and intentions my person-stage has now. 
It is the having of certain psychological states by my preceding person-stage that causes me to 
have at least a portion of those states today. Parfit examines three possible causal relations 
between the psychological states of one person-stage and the states of another: the narrow 
view, the wide view and the widest view
20
. 
• On the narrow view I remember an event because I did experience the event and the 
memory is causally dependent in the normal way on that event
21
. Implicit in holding the 
narrow view is a commitment to bodily (brain) continuity as this is what normally 
ensures the retention of some memories, beliefs, desires and intentions
22
. 
• According the wide view I remember an event because of a reliable cause. In this 
scenario I remember an event because, for example, an evil scientist who is proficient at 
invasive brain surgery has implanted a memory into my mind
23
. In the Brownson case 
we say that Brownson is Brown because the surgery was a reliable method of Brown’s 
psychological states being retained. 
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 Parfit 1987, p. 207-9 
21
 Parfit 1987, p. 207 
22
 Parfit 1987, p. 208 
23
 Parfit 1987, p. 208 
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• On the widest view any cause will do
24
. I remember an event because the memory has 
been uploaded onto a computer system to be passed on to someone else. However a 
glitch occurs and by accident the memory is planted in my mind. 
For Parfit, any cause will do. He rejects bodily continuity in general because he sees nothing 
special about bodily matter. When we are concerned about a friend, we are not concerned 
about his physical mass, but about how he feels and thinks – his emotional well-being. Whilst 
we worry about each other’s bodies, for example their health, we do so because we are 
concerned about a person with a certain character, not because of our concern for their body 
itself. As to the one part of the body Parfit expresses some concern with, he does so only 
because it is the part of the body that ordinarily ensures psychological continuity. Parfit 
admits that the brain is of interest to us to some extent, but since he accepts teletransportation 
as a possibility, he thinks that a person’s psychological states are not identical to their brain. 
Parfit offers an analogy to explain why he does not think bodies should be considered 
necessary for psychological continuity. He imagines that advances in the future will allow 
scientists to create artificial eyes that give a blind person visual experiences by using a lens 
and suitably small computer
25
. The blind person’s visual experience would depend on this 
method, whether or not we would want to call what he does as seeing. Similarly, whether or 
not we say that when an individual teletransports that he continues to be the same person, 




Furthermore, he argues that the cause does not even need to be reliable because the 
difference between a reliable cause and any cause is trivial. Whether or not the teletransporter 
works each and every time someone tries to use it is irrelevant to the consequence of 
successful teletransportation. We should be concerned with whether the desired effect has 




Another important part of the psychological continuity account involves quasi-
propositional states. Earlier we discussed the objection that memory can only provide us with 
a circular definition of personal identity. Parfit and Shoemaker avoid the objection by 
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 Parfit 1987, p. 208 
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 Parfit 1987, p. 208 
26
 Parfit 1987, p. 209 
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introducing the notion of quasi-memories
27
. A quasi-memory is a memory of an event that did 
happen but was not experienced by the person with the quasi-memory. For example, I have 
never been to New York, but it may be possible that I have a quasi-memory of being there. 
Crucially, there is no difference to my experience of the memory – the memory is just of 
being in New York from the first person perspective, but not of a particular person, me, being 
in New York
28
. So, for something to be a quasi-memory it is necessary that someone had an 
experience a, that I have a memory of experience a, my apparent memory of a is causally 
dependent on this other person’s having experienced a
29
. Instead of having to explain how it 
is that personal identity can be defined in terms of memory, which already presupposes 
diachronic identity, we can apply the concept of quasi-memories. On this view, what we 
normally call memories are simply a special sub-class of quasi-memories – special in the 
sense that their content is of events that happened to the person who has the quasi-memory
30
. 
The charge against the psychological account was that it used memories to explain 
personal identity, even though they presuppose identity because an individual only has 
memories of the experiences that they have had
31
. However a quasi-memory makes no such 
assumption. Whilst using memories does require us to specify that the individual with the 
memory is the same person as the individual who had the experience, using quasi-memories 
in our criterion forces us to make no such claims. Parfit gets continuity in quasi-memories by 
appealing to chains of strong connectedness between person-stages
32
. 
 The psychological continuity account does not just rely on memories – Parfit extends 
the quasi- concept to other propositional states. I can have the intention to do something, 
implying that it will be me who does the thing intended. I may intend to go skiing next winter. 
Ordinarily we take this to mean that I intend that I go skiing next winter. Parfit gives us no 
explanation of quasi-intentions, and it is not obvious how an intention can be separated from 
the subject who has the intention, unlike memories of events. My intention to go skiing does 
not seem merely to be an intention that ‘skiing is done’. In fact, I can be sure that skiing will 
be done next year even though I have no intention myself to book a trip to visit a ski slope
33
. 
Parfit wants the quasi- concept to apply to desires and beliefs also.  It is less obvious that 
either desires or beliefs normally have any ‘me’ quality which defines them as beliefs rather 
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 Parfit 1987, p. 219-223, Shoemaker, Sydney 1970: ‘Persons and their Pasts’ American Philosophical 
Quarterly 7:4: 269-285. 
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 Parfit 1987, p. 221 
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 Parfit 1987, p. 220 
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 Shoemaker 1970, p. 271 
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 Parfit 1987, p. 222 
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 I owe David McCarthy for helpful discussion about this issue. 
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than quasi-beliefs and desires rather than quasi-desires, in the way intentions seem to have a 
‘me’ quality. But as with intentions, Parfit gives no explanation of how we should understand 




If we return now to the teletransportation case that Parfit describes before he outlines 
his psychological account we can tackle the problem of reduplication. In a second scenario 
Derek (A) goes to the teletransportation device, but instead of his body being destroyed before 
the replica is formed on Mars as usually happens, he (B) continues to exist on Earth as well as 
the Martian replica (C) being produced
34
. He (B) exists on Earth, and Replica (C) exists on 
Mars. We may have been persuaded earlier that personal identity holds when 
teletransportation occurs, but now there are two persons claiming to be identical to Derek (A) 
prior to teletransportation. 
 There are several options in deciding what has happened. Since personal identity is a 
one-one relation it is clear that personal identity cannot hold between both A and B, and 
between A and C. If this were true then B and C would have to be numerically identical, rather 
than merely qualitatively identical, and this is not the case. If we were to believe in a physical 
criterion for personal identity (i.e. bodily continuity), then the teletransportation case would 
not be a problem – the replica on Mars does not have bodily continuity with A. However, 
Parfit presents a psychological view and upholds that psychological continuity could be 
sustained by coded transmission across space. Parfit introduces, therefore, the caveat that 
personal identity holds if there is no branching. 
 In this reduplication situation, the psychological states that normally ensure personal 
identity holds have branched in two. On one branch there is Derek still on Earth (B), and on 
the other there is Replica on Mars (C). Our intuitions might tell us that B has more right to 
claim to be the same person as A before the teletransportation went so wrong. After all, B’s 
current existence has a normal cause, whilst Replica has a rather unusual claim to existence. 
However, we should not be too hasty in our assessment. We were only too happy to accept 
that teletransportation did not contravene the rules of personal identity when the original on 
Earth was destroyed before the replica was created. 
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 The thought experiment is an example of a fission puzzle. The possibility that sets of 
psychological states can undergo fission, giving rise to two or more possible persons who all 
claim personal identity with one original has been met with a variety of responses. Parfit’s 
response, as noted, is to claim that personal identity only holds uniquely. So for psychological 
continuity to give us personal identity it must obtain uniquely. 
 Another response comes from perdurantist David Lewis. Lewis accepts the four-
dimensionalist view that whilst persons are long-lived objects, these persons are made up of 
momentary stages
35
. In asking if a person is the same over time we ask if person-stage x at 
time t1 belongs to the same person as person-stage y at t2, where a person is the sum of all his 
person-stages. For Lewis fission should not be understood as the creation of two persons out 
of one, but of the temporary coincidence of two persons who have shared a series of person 
stages
36
. So, if asked how many people there are, Lewis would respond both prior to and post 







: S, S1 and S2 are all person-stages, whilst C1 and C2 
are, according to Lewis, persons 
 
In Diagram A we see how Lewis understands a case of fission. At time t0 we have one 
person-stage, S, and at this time persons C1 and C2 are coincident – they share the same 
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person-stage. Later at time t1, after fission has occurred, there are two person-stages; S1 is a 
person-stage of C1 only, while S2 is a person-stage of person C2 only
39
. 
 This response is contrary to common sense
40
. Before fission has occurred I would 
object to someone referring to me as two different persons. If I am walking along moments 
before fission will occur and someone, glancing at me, is asked how many people he sees, he 
will answer that he sees one person. 
 Lewis deals with this incongruity by suggesting we count by stages
41
. Before fission 
at any particular time there is one stage present, whereas after fission there are two separate 
stages, one belonging to Derek^ and one belonging to Derek*. Before fission Derek^ and 
Derek* shared stages, but post fission they do not. Counting in this way might deal with the 
immediate problem of how many people there are at any one time, but it is contrary to our 
intuitions
42
. Lewis suggests we imagine that someone asks us how many roads he must cross 
to get to a particular destination
43
. If he travels in a straight line he will cross what appears to 
be one road, but is in fact a point at which three roads converge
44
. These three roads are not 
identical, yet we would not tell the man he must cross three roads, but only one. We do not 
therefore, he says, always count by identity, so in fact our intuition that we do is mistaken
45
. 
 Theodore Sider has objected to Lewis’ view of counting by claiming that the example 
above should be understood as a case in which we would count by road segments. Although 
the question is phrased in terms of ‘roads’, when we use the term we do not always intend to 
talk about ‘continuant roads’
46
. If the man’s intentions in asking how many roads he must 
cross do not concern continuant roads, but road segments, then this indicates why we do not 
count by identity in the example
47
. It is not obvious that in cases of personal identity and 
fission we mean to talk about anything other than complete persons, rather than person-stages. 
 Moreover, Lewis’ claim that there are two persons before fission seems to suggest 
that the number of persons at any given time is dependent on what will happen in the future
48
. 
If I were to divide into twenty people next year, then we would be forced to claim that there 
are twenty (long-lived) persons existing now, all coincident with one person-stage. This is at 
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odds with our belief that the existence of a person in the present should not depend on the 
existence of anyone in the future. 
 Lewis’ reason for invoking his system of counting by person-stages is to persuade us 
that Parfit’s account of survival (see below) can be reconciled with our intuitions that identity 
matters as much as survival
49
. However, in aiming to satisfy one intuition, Lewis expects us to 
disregard a second intuition: that we count by numerical identity. Furthermore, he must find 
some way of dealing with the problem of stating how many persons are present at a time 




In the teletransportation/branching scenario Parfit makes one other addition. The 
malfunctioning of the machine, that has led to Derek’s body on Earth not being destroyed as 
usual, has done irreparable damage to his heart, that is, the heart of B
50
. B is given only a day 
to live before B will die of heart failure. Parfit asks us now how we should feel about the 
situation if we were in this position
51
. On the one hand, Derek has only a few hours of life 
left, so he will feel miserable and greatly pessimistic. On the other, his replica on Mars will 
continue to live a happy and healthy life for as many years as he could hope to live. All his 
plans will be carried out, his friends and family will not feel any loss, they will continue to 
live and communicate with his replica. To everyone around him there will be no difference 
between this outcome and an ordinary case of teletransportation. 
The psychological account tells us that personal identity is a matter of psychological 
continuity and/or connectedness with the right kind of causal relation, the whole of which is 
labelled Relation R for brevity’s sake. If Relation R holds then we have identity, on the 
condition that there is no branching, in other words, that Relation R holds uniquely. If there is 
no branching then Relation R holds between x at time t1 and y only at time t2. There is nothing 
else at t2 with a claim to personal identity with x. 
So, PI = Relation R + Uniqueness. The claim then is that, in the equation, Relation R 
is much more important than uniqueness
52
. If there was no Relation R we could not have any 
kind of personal identity at all, whereas without uniqueness there is most of what makes 
personal identity hold. Uniqueness ensures there are no other challengers for the title of being 
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me. What this means is that Relation R on its own is about as good as personal identity. 
Consider the fission case again, although instead of anyone dying of heart failure in a short 
space of time, both B and C continue to live full, happy and long lives. In this case, neither B 
nor C can be said to be identical to A. However, Parfit claims, we cannot regard the positions 
of either B or C as anywhere close to death
53
. They have both survived teletransportation, 
simply not as A, but as two different persons. 
 In fact, given that Relation R ensures survival, and uniqueness provides us with 
personal identity, we should be concerned with survival rather than personal identity. In the 
formula Relation R does all the important work, whilst uniqueness is an addendum, so 
survival is what matters. 
 
 
1.9) Williams and Reduplication 
 There is also another reason for Parfit’s rejection of personal identity in favour of 
survival. He subscribes to two conditions which Bernard Williams purportedly lays down for 
any criterion of personal identity
54
. According to Parfit, Williams claims that any criterion 
must fulfil the following two requirements: 
“Requirement (1): Whether a future person will be must depend only on the intrinsic 
features of the relation between us. It cannot depend on what happens to other 
people. 
Requirement (2): Since personal identity has great significance, whether identity 




Williams actually puts the case slightly differently himself. He argues that: 
“No principle P will be a philosophically satisfactory criterion of identity for Ts if the 





He also argues that since identity is a logical relation that can only hold between one x and 
one other x at any particular time, then any account of personal identity must also be one-one, 
rather than one-many
57
. The criterion of personal identity must itself be one-one
58
; our 
criterion cannot be a one-many relation that is held in check by an arbitrary stipulation. 
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Parfit’s own account rests on psychological continuity, but as a criterion of personal 
identity, psychological continuity admits of reduplication, which leads us to contravene 
Requirement 1
59
. If I can be teletransported to Mars, then the same information that is used in 
that replication can be transmitted again to another planet, and can be used again to create a 
further replica
60
. If I teletransport to Mars then, so Parfit claims, I continue to exist as the 
replica. But, if a second replica is made several weeks later somewhere else, then suddenly I 
cease to exist. In place of me there is a whole new person on Mars, and a whole new person 
on another planet, say Mercury
61
. Thus, psychological continuity does not meet Requirement 
1 – whether I continue to exist would depend on whether another individual has been created 
or not. 
 Moreover, whether we have personal identity in a particular situation, according to 
Parfit, is in fact trivial
62
. What should concern us is psychological continuity itself, and not 
whether it holds uniquely. But this contradicts Requirement 2: whether personal identity holds 
cannot rest on something trivial. 
 Parfit argues that no other account can meet the two requirements. Williams’ own 
suggestion that spatio-temporal bodily continuity could be a criterion for personal identity can 
be met with a similar objection, which Williams does himself consider
63
. We might imagine a 
person who could divide in two, like an amoeba, and thus his physical continuity would also 
divide in two
64
: so the physical criterion is also open to the problem of reduplication. 
Earlier we examined reasons to be sceptical about the significance of bodily 
continuity in our account of personal identity, but accepted that the brain seems to be of 
special significance because parts of the brain seem not to undergo any change during an 
adult’s lifetime, and also because of the role the brain plays in the continuity of our mental 
lives. A physical criterion of personal identity might thus rely simply on the continuity of the 
brain, but this account also fails to meet Williams’ two requirements. Parfit claims that 
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So, if we revisit Shoemaker’s example of Brown and Robinson’s problematic surgery 
we might imagine that the left hemisphere of Brown’s brain is placed in Robinson’s body 
(creating Brown1), whilst the right hemisphere is left in place (creating Brown2). It might take 
a while for Brown1
 
to learn to perform certain actions and movements that normally require 
the existence of the right hemisphere, and similarly it may take Brown2 some practice before 
he can perform actions that normally use parts of the left hemisphere
66
. However, such a 
transplant is logically possible. This set up gives us an example of physical continuity 
fissioning in two, in just the way Williams seeks to avoid. If Parfit is correct, and in fact all 
accounts of personal identity are subject to this problem of reduplication, then they will all 
only avoid it by stipulating that the relation in question does not hold between one individual 
and many others, but this contravenes the second requirement
67
. 
 Parfit’s response is to present survival as fit for our concern, rather than personal 
identity. Since survival is not a one-one relation, then whether I survive in a particular 
situation will not depend on the existence of any other individuals
68
. If I am replicated many 
times over, then I survive as each individual. So, survival (understood as psychological 
continuity and/or connectedness with the right kind of cause) meets Requirement 1. It also 
meets Requirement 2; survival occurs in all cases in which Relation R holds, whether or not it 
does so uniquely
69
. Thus, whether there is survival does not depend on a trivial stipulation that 
I am the only individual who can claim to be psychologically continuous with an earlier 
person. 
 By insisting we must meet these requirements, Parfit gives another reason for 
favouring survival over personal identity. My aim in this dissertation will be to establish a 
psychological account of personal identity that is not open to reduplication. I will examine 
ways of adapting the psychological account, or at least, ways in which we should think about 
psychological continuity that might provide us with a stronger criterion which would resist 
attempts to show duplication is possible. 
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Thus, psychological continuity is a relation holding between person-stages. For there to be 
continuity between two person-stages there must be a chain of psychologically connected 
person-stages connecting the two. For there to be a connection between two person-stages 
there must be similarity between at least half of their beliefs, desires, intentions and memories 
with a causal connection. For psychological continuity to generate personal identity it must 
hold uniquely. In cases where there is branching, i.e. where there is more than one person-
stage that is continuous with an earlier stage, we cannot have identity (identity being a one-
one relation). However, we do have what matters in survival. To survive there must be 
psychological continuity between two person-stages, even if there are other person-stages also 
continuous with the earlier stage. 
 
 
2.1) The Causal Requirement 
As far as the causal relation linking one person-stage to another goes, there are four 
possibilities for the proponent of psychological continuity. Psychological continuity could 
rely on: 
o the normal cause 
o a dependable/reliable cause 
o any cause 
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o no cause at all 
The first option, the normal cause, is usually coincident with bodily continuity in the 
case of humans. This bodily continuity might simply be brain continuity if we believe that the 
brain is the only part of the body that supports the mind, or it could be a broader kind of 
bodily continuity. However, it seems safe to assume that the normal cause of psychological 
continuity requires some maintenance of the body. For anyone adamant that teletransportation 
is possible, the normal cause is too strong a relation to connect one person-stage to another. It 
does not allow for all the scenarios we want to say sustain personal identity. As mentioned 
earlier, all known cases of personal identity probably coincide with bodily continuity, but this 
does not mean that the normal cause is necessary for personal identity. It merely shows that 
the normal cause is sufficient for personal identity. 
A dependable or reliable cause would allow more possibilities than the ordinary 
causal chain based on bodily continuity, but would still always result in the psychological 
states of A being the psychological states of B. A reliable cause might be the actions of a 
teletransportation machine. The machine is known never to malfunction, and so every time 
anyone enters on Earth, his or her replica is produced on Mars by a reliable cause. The 
psychological connection between A and B has a reliable cause. The link therefore between 
the two is strong connectedness and therefore continuity with a reliable cause. Because 
teletransportation has occurred there is no continuity of bodily matter (although it may be said 
that Replica’s body has some kind of formal continuity with A). Earthman and Replica are 
made up of quantitatively different matter, so there is certainly not a normal cause for the 
psychological continuity in place. However, since we know we can depend on the outcome of 
the teletransporter, then we can be assured that psychological continuity will hold. 
The third option is yet wider than the reliable cause: the kind of cause appropriate to 
ensure psychological continuity could be any cause at all. There need be nothing reliable 
about the method that has brought about my existence, as long as I am connected to my 
previous person-stage, so there is continuity between all my person-stages. We can imagine a 
situation where the teletransporter occasionally works and occasionally malfunctions resulting 
in a mixture of various psychological states being grouped to make a new person. If A on 
Earth walks into the teletransporter and Replica B steps out of the receiver on Mars and there 
is psychological continuity between the two, then we have no reason to suppose that in this 
instance personal identity does not hold. We have the same situation as with the second 
option, except that in this case the teletransporter is only successful on some occasions. When 
it is successful we still have personal identity, even if this success is a much rarer occurrence. 
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The rarity does not change how well psychologically connected A is with B. I propagate 
tomato plants, but they do not produce fruit each year. Some years I forget to pick off the 
flowers, thus failing to ensure that a crop is produced. Nevertheless I do remember on 
occasion, and if I do, the plants produce a crop of cherry tomatoes. Just because a plant does 
not produce tomatoes, or more pertinently, just because I do not always remember to tend to 
my tomato plants, does not mean that there are never occasions when I can enjoy eating 
cherry tomatoes produced by the plants. The rarity of their existence does not mean that the 
tomatoes are not real. 
Our last option is that no cause is necessary. In this situation, there need be no causal 
chain linking A to B. Scott Campbell
70
 suggests that we imagine that when I step into the 
teletransporter my body is scanned and destroyed as usual. However, instead of the 
information being transmitted and re-created on Mars, the receiver on Mars has generated a 
random set of psychological states and acted on this information instead. By chance, this 
random set matches exactly the information based on myself on Earth that should have been 
transmitted to Mars. So, someone who is exactly psychologically similar to me is created on 
Mars. Campbell claims that the resulting person, whom he calls Random, is psychologically 
sequential with me
71
. Something is sequential when it is as similar as it would be if it was 
continuous, but there is no causal connection between the two. 
 
 
2.2) Parfit’s Reasoning 
When Parfit chooses between the four he opts for the third alternative. It should be 
clear already that, as a proponent of the psychological continuity account, Parfit does not put 
much store in bodily continuity. At best, it is an accompaniment in usual cases of 
psychological continuity, but it has no fundamental importance in an account of personal 
identity. He says of physical continuity: 
“What we value, in ourselves and others, is not the continued existence of the same 
particular brains and bodies. What we value are the various relations between 
ourselves and others, whom and what we love, our ambitions, achievements, 
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For Parfit, although the normal cause is sufficient for personal identity, it is not necessary. If 
we include normal causes as necessary in our criterion of personal identity then we limit the 
possible kinds of cases of personal identity there can be. 
 Moreover, even a reliable cause is too strong a necessity for the criterion of personal 
identity, Parfit claims. What matters is psychological continuity and connectedness, not how 
often the continuity comes about. So, even if the reason for A and B being the same person is 
an unreliable cause, this does not prevent them from being one and the same person. What 
matters to us is the effect, and not the nature of the cause of the effect
73
. 
 Parfit does not go as far as claiming that there need not be a cause at all, possibly 
because this would reduce his theory to psychological similarity, leaving open the possibility 
that personal identity could hold between any two person-stages that are psychologically 
similar. If this were the case then it might be acceptable to claim that, if I were to die in a car 
accident tomorrow, I would continue to exist in the form of my psychologically similar sister 
or a friend even
74
. If my sister is psychologically very similar to me (we share, perhaps, many 
similar beliefs, and memories, and share many intentions) then my being killed would not 
mean that I did not survive. Whilst Parfit wants to examine all possible cases of personal 
identity and survival, he seems to maintain the requirement of a causal connection to avoid 
opening up the criterion too much and allowing all kinds of cases of psychological similarity 
to count as survival. 
 Thus in the equation ‹PI = Relation R + Uniqueness›, Relation R stands for any 
(psychologically-based) causal connectedness between person-stages. 
 
 
2.3) The Objection 
Against Parfit’s analysis, Scott Campbell and Robert Elliot have claimed that a 
psychological account of personal identity should be taken yet wider
75
. In other words, if in 
any situation we have strong psychological similarity then just this is sufficient for survival. If 
A and B are similar enough, then there need be no causal connection linking them together. It 
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need not be the case that the psychological states of B are in any way causally dependent on 
the psychological states of A. 
 Now, neither of them makes the claim that similarity alone is sufficient for personal 
identity, for personal identity is a one-one relation, and psychological similarity, even more 
than psychological continuity, is likely to be a one-many relation. However, Parfit claims that 
personal identity is not as significant as we tend to suppose. What should be of concern to us 
is survival, because in any case of survival what matters to us continues to exist. So, if 
survival has a wider criterion then we need to rethink our formulation of personal identity: 
causal connections might be necessary for personal identity in the same way that the relation 
must hold uniquely, but survival should be understood in broader terms. In this chapter I will 
outline the objection made against a causal requirement, and for psychological similarity. It 
will become clear that, in particular, Campbell’s understanding of survival runs into problems 
about the nature of mental content, the focus of the third chapter. Ultimately I will claim that 
we should prefer Parfit’s psychological continuity account of personal identity and survival to 





Campbell labels the kind of psychological account that he thinks we should endorse 
Psychological Sequentialism. Two person-stages are sequential if: 
(i) one is psychologically continuous and/or connected with the other; or 
(ii) the two are quasi-connected; or 
(iii) there is a chain of quasi-connectedness between the two.76 
 
The significant addition is the notion of quasi-connectedness. Two person-stages are quasi-
connected if person-stage B’s psychological states are “just as they would be if B is 
psychologically connected to A.”
77
 So, two person-stages are sequential if they are as similar 
as they would be if they were causally connected. 
 Campbell reiterates Parfit’s argument in favour of any causal link over a reliable 
cause, in defence of his own preference: sequentialism. When it is the effect that matters, we 
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should not be concerned with the method of achieving it
78
. When all that matters is the 
content of my beliefs, desires, intentions and memories, no causal link should be necessary at 
all. 
 Elliot says something similar, claiming that there should be no such thing as what he 
labels the Causal Continuity Requirement (CCR)
79
. Instead, though, of arguing that 
psychological accounts of personal identity should take the wider stance of sequentialism as 
Campbell does, Elliot claims that in rejecting the CCR we leave the reductionist position 
untenable, forcing us to look elsewhere for a criterion of personal identity
80
. 
 Despite their differing conclusions, Elliot and Campbell present a similar attack on 
the standard account of personal identity. They imagine two similar scenarios, one in which, 
on the standard account, personal identity holds, and one where it does not. In the first 
situation the teletransporter (evil scientist or omnipotent demon), brings about the existence of 
B based on the previous existence of A. The existence of the psychological states of B 
depends causally on the previous existence of those states in the form of A. So with 
teletransportation, we have the same story as Parfit originally offers us; A steps into the 
teletransporter on Earth and B walks out on Mars. In the second case something slightly 
different happens. As in the no-causal-link example in Section 2.1, there is a glitch in the 
system, and instead of B being produced as a result of the information gathered from A, a 
random set of properties is generated and then instantiated in C. But, by chance, C is just the 
way B would have been had he been created instead. C is sequential with A
81
. 
 The only difference between the two cases is the causal connection, or lack thereof, 
between the psychology of A, and the psychologies of B and C. Campbell and Elliot both 
argue that the difference between the two is not as significant as might be supposed. We 
often, Campbell admits, find that small differences do make a large difference to the outcome 
of a situation
82
. So, when a malfunction in a computer system causes the electricity to go 
down in a hospital and brings about the loss of hundreds of lives, then the difference between 
the tiny malfunction occurring and not occurring is significant. However, in the scenario 
presented by Elliot and by Campbell it is not the outcome that differs. In both cases we have 
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exactly the same set of psychological states that emerges from the teletransporter. B and C 
differ only in how they got there and, claim Campbell and Elliot, this is of no import. 
 In support they invoke Williams: personal identity, is of such significance that 
whether personal identity holds cannot depend on something trivial
83
. Parfit uses this 
stipulation to argue against the significance we place on personal identity and in favour of 
survival. He claims that survival meets this requirement – survival is so important, that 
whether I survive or not cannot depend on something arbitrary or trivial
84
. Parfit says that 
Relation R with the right kind of cause meets this stipulation. But Elliot and Campbell claim, 
the difference between there being a causal connection between two person-stages and there 
being none is itself trivial. If, Elliot says, psychological continuity is sufficient for survival, 
then psychological similarity is also
85
. All that is required is psychological continuity and/or 
connectedness, even Relation R with its requirement of a causal connection is too strong for a 





2.5) Campbell’s examples 
Campbell gives several related examples to support his assertion that the random set 
of states generated by the teletransporter provides us with personal identity as long as the 
content of the states of B are sequential with those of A. 
 An evil scientist alters your brain to the specifications of a randomly generated set of 
psychological states that just happen to be identical to those just before the alteration
87
. This is 
the example of the indiscernible swap: you are not even aware that a change has occurred, and 
yet there is no causal connection between your psychological states at the present time and 
your previous psychological states. Why should we claim that you do not survive in this case, 
even though we would if there was a causal link between pre- and post-brain alteration? 
Campbell claims that our intuitions tell us that this is at least survival, if not personal identity, 
but according to psychological continuity there are in fact two different persons involved. 
 Campbell also gives the example of the ‘new club’, an analogy which Parfit 
introduces, but which Campbell thinks favours his conclusion of sequentialism rather than 
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continuity. In the example Dan finds the regulations and description of a club that has ceased 
to exist
88
. Upon reading the information Dan decides to set up a new club (Y) following the 
regulations about the old one (X) that he has read. The existence of the new club is causally 
dependent on the existence of the old club, and the way the new club is run is dependent on 
the old one also. We might say that the old club has survived in the guise of the new one: in 
setting up the new club, Dan has revived the old one. 
 In Campbell’s addition to the analogy we are to imagine a similar situation, except 
Dan has found a file on his computer with a random set of regulations, generated by a 
malfunction of the computer. It just so happens that the random set of regulations exactly 
matches the list of rules for X that actually existed, so when Dan sets up his new club (Z) he 
sets up a club that is exactly like the club he would have set up had he read the genuine 
regulations. Club Z is sequential to Club X even if there is no causal dependence between the 
existence of Z and the existence of X. 
 The first part of the analogy is used by Parfit to argue that persons should be treated 
in the same ways as we view Dan’s revival of the club. If Dan can read some rules and from 
this information recreate a defunct club, and we accept that what seems to matter to us in our 
own survival is the continuity of our psychological states, then we should accept that 
teletransportation is possible. There is nothing intrinsic about me that means I cannot survive 
a trip to Mars by this means. 
Parfit plays on the analogy between a club and a person: a club may be made of 
different individuals, but as long as the structure and rules are the same, then the club is the 
same.  Similarly a person may be made of different matter at different times, but nevertheless, 
he or she remains the same person. However, I am not sure the two are similar enough for a 
full analogy. Whilst there may be no answer as to whether club Y is numerically the same as 
X, it is certainly qualitatively the same, apart from the difference in who its individual 
members are. But in the case of personal identity we are looking for numerical identity. If 
Replica is not numerically identical to whom he is a replica of, then the two are not the same 
person. In fact, it would seem that Parfit, in making the analogy, is hinting at his claim that 
survival is what matters, and not identity. For, as clubs Y and X need not be numerically 
identical, but can still be referred to (non-philosophically) as the ‘same’, if I am replicated 
twice, I can survive as both Replicas whilst being numerically identical to neither. 
Campbell adapts the analogy to suggest that continuity (the holding of a chain of 
strong psychological connections with the right kind of cause) is too strong a criterion for 
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survival. If A can survive as B, then A can also survive as C, in the same way that Z is as 
much the revival of Club X as Y is. 
 Several other examples of survival are proffered by Campbell in an attempt to 
convince us that being sequential with a person-stage is surviving as much as being 
continuous with it might be. One example is that of a set of old tapes on which I have 
managed to record all the pertinent information about my psychological states
89
. This taped 
version of myself, Campbell claims, allows me to survive even if I am killed in a car crash 
some days later. He argues that psychologically continuity will not allow this because there is 
no causal connection between me just before the crash and the taped replica of me
90
. 
However, it is difficult to see the difference between an old tape and the teletransportation 
case. Campbell claims that because there is a time lag between the creation of the tape and my 
death, the taped replica is not R-related to me-just-before-I-die. However in Parfit’s 
description of teletransportation we have a similar example. My replica on Mars exists before 
I die, yet even though I know I will die in a couple of hours or days, allowing for a large 
number of psychological differences between myself on Earth as I die and the replica on 
Mars. This does not mean I cannot survive as the replica. What makes this a case of survival 
is the right causal connection and enough psychological continuity. This does not mean that 
my psychological states must be caused by the person-stage that directly preceded the current 
stage. 
 Campbell fails to show that sequentialism deals with the old tapes case better than the 
psychological continuity account, because of a misunderstanding about how the latter can be 
applied in this situation. 
 In yet another example we meet a version of Swampman
91
; at a certain time a person, 
Sammy, is instantly destroyed and just after, by sheer coincidence, on another planet a bolt of 
lightening hits a swamp and Swampy is created, who happens to be exactly like Sammy
92
. 
According to Campbell, Swampy has what matters in survival, even though he is only 
sequential with the original person, and there really is no causal connection. This is the most 
obvious example Campbell offers of a scenario where there is no causal connection between 
the original and Random. There is supposed to be no qualitative difference between Swampy 
and the replica that steps out of the teletransporter on Mars, the only difference between them 
is the causal dependence that holds between the replica and the original on which his 
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psychological states are based. As such, though, it is not obvious that Swampy provides us 
with another example of psychological sequentialism in action. In lacking any causal relation 
to anything, it is not clear that Swampy has any thoughts, beliefs, memories or intentions, let 
alone the same mental states as Sammy had. I will come back to this example in the following 
chapter – for now I will summarise our possible responses to the charge that psychological 
continuity is not radical enough. 
 
 
2.6) Possible responses 
There are two different options we can take at this point: 
 
(1) We are persuaded by Campbell and reject continuity in favour of sequentialism. As 
die-hard believers in a psychological account we are forced to admit that if what 
matters in survival is the kind of psychological states we have over time, then the way 
these states came about is insignificant. As such we must ignore the problem of 
‘surviving’ as a multitude of different people when we die because of all the 
psychologically similar states there are between me when I die and the people around 
me. 
 
(2) We do not accept the force of Campbell’s argument, and claim instead that Parfit was 
correct to differentiate between psychological continuity and similarity. In particular, 
Campbell’s example of Sammy and Swampy draws to attention a difference between 
psychological continuity and similarity that leaves the latter open to criticism by 
proponents of externalism about mental content. This issue forms the next chapter of 
my dissertation, as I will attempt to show that, as long as we are prepared to side with 
the externalist over mental content, then we cannot make sense of the claim that 
Sammy survives as Swampy. For both personal identity and survival, the causal 
relation between two person-stages is integral to them sharing the same mental states, 



















Donald Davidson introduces Swampman in his paper ‘Knowing One’s Own Mind’ in order to 
examine arguments put forward by Putnam and Burge for externalism about, respectively, 
linguistic and mental content. Campbell’s discussion about Swampman brings to the fore an 
interesting way in which it might appear that the issues surrounding teletransportation, 
specifically the problem of reduplication, can be dealt with. 
 The internalism/externalism debate centres around the way in which content is 
individuated. The internalist claim is that mental content is fixed by features of the individual 
(that content is narrow), whilst the externalist claims that it depends directly on the 
environment as well as the individual’s internal states (at least some content is wide). So, for 
the (non-dualist) internalist, two individuals who have exactly the same intrinsic physical 
states should have exactly the same content to their mental state. The debate is not concerned 
with whether the environment can influence content instrumentally
93
. Being in a certain 
environment will cause me to have beliefs about being in that environment. When I read 
Putnam’s ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’ I will have the belief that I am reading a paper by 
Putnam. The paper will cause my belief, but this is not what is in question. In this kind of way 
both internalists and externalists agree that the environment can influence the content of my 
mental states; what is at issue is whether the environment determines content directly
94
. 
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It may be possible to claim that reduplication of persons is not possible, because the 
duplicate will not have the same mental contents as the original who stepped into the 
teletransporter. I will examine whether this can be established if mental contents are 
individuated externally. Unlike Campbell, we want to claim that Sammy does not survive as 
Swampy. I will also examine arguments for externalism to see if they will aid me in my 
defence of personal identity against the need for a separate category of survival in cases 
where psychological continuity does not hold uniquely. In this chapter, therefore, I will 
consider the possibility that Replica on Mars does not have psychological continuity with the 
original on Earth, and also whether Campbell’s Random has any mental states at all. 
 
 
3.1) Twin Earth 
The argument for externalism has roots in a thought experiment about Earth and Twin 
Earth. According to the experiment I am to imagine that I have a doppelganger, Twin Alisa, 
who lives on Twin Earth
95
. This planet appears to be almost exactly alike to Earth, and Twin 
Alisa appears to be exactly alike to me, in other words Twin Alisa has the same internal states 
that I have. Now, on Twin Earth the substance that flows in the rivers, fills the lakes and 
reservoirs and pours out of the faucet appears to be just like water. It looks, feels and tastes 
like water, and forms an ice-like substance when cold, and a steam-like substance when hot. 
When rain falls on Twin Earth it would appear to be water with which one is being soaked. 
With all these similarities in observable properties
96
, if I were to visit Twin Earth I would 
initially think it was water. However, on Twin Earth this substance is not H2O, but a liquid 
with a completely different molecular structure, which we can simplify here to XYZ
97
. 
According to the argument for externalism, when I go to Twin Earth and refer to the 
substance I see in the lake, XYZ, by calling it ‘water’ I will be mistaken
98
. 
However, if Twin Alisa were to call it ‘water’ she would not be. This is because, 
Putnam argues, ““meanings” just ain’t in the head”
99
. What I am referring to when I say 
‘water’ is the liquid I have come across in the past that has shaped my understanding of what 
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water is, that is, H2O. Whereas, when Twin Alisa uses the word ‘water’ she refers to XYZ, the 
liquid that has been the historical basis for her learning of the word ‘water’. So, when Twin 
Alisa says ‘water’ she does not mean water, but twin water. 
It is not relevant that I know whether water and twin water are the same liquid, 
merely that the historical basis for my reference would be one of these liquids, and not the 
other. Putnam imagines that travellers visit Twin Earth in 1750, before the molecular 
structures of water and twin water have been discovered
100
. Despite their lack of knowledge 
about the molecular difference between the two liquids, Alisa and Twin Alisa’s utterances 
about water would still have different contents. This is because Alisa’s experiences in the past 
have been of H2O, whether she knows it or not, whilst Twin Alisa’s experiences have been of 
XYZ. Our knowledge about the natural kind in question is irrelevant, what matters is that my 
concept of water has been derived from encounters with H2O. If in 1750 I come across some 
XYZ on Twin Earth and say ‘here is some water’ I will be just as mistaken as I would be 
today in making such a comment. 
 The point of this thought experiment is to show that linguistic content is individuated, 
at least partially, externally to the individual. Because Alisa and Twin Alisa have exactly the 
same internal states, the difference in their meaning when they each use the word ‘water’ 
must depend on the differences in the liquids themselves. Specifically Putnam’s argument 
seeks to show that some of our beliefs about natural kind concepts depend on the identity of 
certain physical substances in our environment. 
In another example Putnam maintains that he cannot tell the difference between a 
beech tree and an elm tree
101
. Whilst his concept of beech trees and his concept of elm trees 
are identical, this does not mean that he means beech when he says ‘elm’ or elm when he says 
‘beech’. The meaning of either word depends on the physical trees, external to Putnam
102
. In 
any instance in which Putnam uses the word ‘beech’ his internal states are identical to the way 
they would be in an instance of his using the word ‘elm’. Nevertheless he does not mean the 
same thing when he says ‘beech’ as when he says ‘elm’.  
Putnam’s catchphrase for externalism – that ‘meanings just ain’t in the head’ – plays 
on the traditional opposition to his view. The internalist believes that content supervenes on 
intrinsic properties of the individual only. Meanings, they argue, depend only on the internal 
states of the person making the utterance. 
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3.2) Burge and Arthritis 
An extension of Putnam’s argument is found in Tyler Burge’s ‘Individualism and the 
Mental’. As well as elements of the environment playing an individuating role in our natural 
kind concepts, Burge argues that the contents of our beliefs and thoughts can supervene on 
our social institutions
103
. Burge’s argument extends Putnam’s both to include other features of 
the environment, and to apply the argument to mental states as well as linguistic utterances. 
In one of Burge’s thought experiments, an individual, say Harry, who speaks English, 
knows he has arthritis in various joints
104
. By this I mean he correctly uses the word to talk 
about the pain he suffers in his joints, and truly believes he suffers from arthritis in his joints. 
But Harry also believes he suffers from arthritis in his leg, not realising that arthritis is a 
condition that affects the joints only, and that the pains in his thigh therefore have some other 
cause. When he says what he believes, that he has arthritis of the thigh, he has a false belief. 
By contrast, we can imagine a counterfactual situation in which Harry lives in a 
community in which ‘arthritis’ refers to any rheumatoid disease, and not just those conditions 
of the joints, so they use the word to refer to, lets say twin arthritis. No one in Harry’s 
(counterfactual) linguistic community possesses the concept arthritis, for by the word 
‘arthritis’ they refer to any rheumatoid disease, to twin arthritis. So, in this community, when 
Harry says ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’ he expresses his true belief. 
Burge argues that because the internal psychological states, and also physical states of 
the body, of each individual are the same in the two situations, then the difference in belief 
must be explained by the linguistic usage of each community, in other words, by an external 
factor
105
. Burge summarises the difference between Harry and his counterfactual opposite 
number thus: 
“The differences seem to stem from differences “outside” the patient considered as 
an isolated physical organism, causal mechanism, or seat of consciousness. The 





Again, the thought experiment is taken to show that we should individuate concepts, 
at least partially, externally. And the thought experiment can be run with any term, Burge 
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says, that an individual can partially misconstrue. He offers other examples, involving 
colours, legal terms, and words used to describe different cuts of meat
107
. 
So, rather than merely natural kind concepts being construed widely, any mental 
content may depend at least in part on social linguistic usage. I might use the word ‘barrister’ 
incorrectly to refer to all lawyers. When I see a solicitor on a news programme I have the 
belief ‘there is a barrister’. In doing so I am mistaken because the linguistic community in 
which I live does not use the word ‘barrister’ to refer to any lawyer in general. However we 
can imagine a society in which the word ‘barrister’ has the extension all lawyers. If I make 
the same appraisal whilst watching the news in this community, I will have a true belief. The 
difference between the mental contents in each instance is not based on any internal 
difference between me-in-the-first-community and me-in-the-second – the difference between 




It is at this point that Davidson’s thought experiment about Swampman should be 
reintroduced, as an illustration of the way that meaning cannot be duplicated without a 
suitable learning process. So, according to the experiment, Davidson happens to be walking 
near a swamp during an electrical storm when a bolt of lightening hits and kills him
108
. At the 
same time the bolt also hits a dead tree stump in the swamp and, by magnificent coincidence, 
creates an exact replica of Davidson. Swampman sets about leaving the swamp, going to 
Davidson’s home to see Davidson’s wife and then to socialise with Davidson’s friends. 
It appears to everyone else who meets Swampman that they have encountered 
Davidson – he appears to recognise his wife and friends and remember the philosophical 
problems he has been working on lately. He appears to function just as Davidson did. 
However, there is one crucial difference. According to Davidson, Swampman doesn’t have 
any thoughts at all – he doesn’t recognise anybody, or remember anything, because he never 
cognised anything in the first place
109
. In order to recognise Davidson’s wife, Swampman 
must have met her before. And in order to be able to make any utterances, he must have learnt 
the meanings of words, in the way we all do as children. When Swampman appears to say 
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something that Davidson would be likely to say, he is not actually saying anything at all, 
because the sounds have no meanings. On the externalist view the right kind of causal 
dependencies between objects and terms referring to those objects are not in place in the case 
of Swampman. His mental states do not have the right kind of causal history to be content-
bearing at all. 
 
 
3.4) Campbell and Externalism 
This is where Campbell takes up the debate. He argues that Swampman could be 
considered the same person as Davidson, in the same, or at least a similar way to the way that 
Parfit and his replica on Mars are the same person. So too, he claims that if there is a double 
of me, Twin Alisa, on Twin Earth, and I (on Earth) were to suddenly die, then I would survive 
as Twin Alisa. Sequentialism seems to entail that, since Twin Alisa is psychologically similar 
to me, then I can survive as Twin Alisa. 
Here is what Campbell has to say about externalism itself, and the threat it creates for 
his account of personal identity: 
“Random, being newly created, is not yet causally connected to anything. Replica on 
the other hand, is causally connected to things, through being the causal product of 
earlier states of myself. Thus, Replica can refer to things, while Random cannot (and 
the same applies to Swampy). Random’s mental states will therefore have internal 
content, but they will not have external content. If externalism is true, then it will 
follow that Replica has genuine memories of my life, or at least “quasi-memories”, 
but Random will have no memories or quasi-memories at all. Nor will Random have 
any intentions or quasi-intentions, or any beliefs, and so on, because these states only 





A radical externalist will believe there is no such thing as internal content, so Campbell’s 
claim that Random’s mental state will have internal content, without a defence of internal 
content itself is questionable. He does concede that some may object that the difference 
between Replica and Random is that the former can refer to things, whilst the latter cannot
111
. 
Random will only have ‘internal content’ if there is any such thing, but will lack ‘external’ 
content (presuming there is external content) because he has no causal relation to Davidson, 
in the way that Replica and Parfit are causally related
112
. The argument may not be merely 
that Swampman cannot refer. If we take up an extreme externalist stance about mental 
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content, then Swampman will not have any beliefs, memories, intentions and desires, and 
neither will he have any quasi-propositional states. In this case everything that is considered 
important in personal identity or survival would be missing from Swampman’s psychology. 
Campbell’s response to this kind of objection is to claim that what Swampman will 
have is “near-beliefs” and “near-intentions”, etc., that is the internal content only of 
Davidson’s beliefs, intentions, memories and desires
113
. And, he asserts, near-beliefs are 
almost exactly the same as beliefs, so Swampman’s beliefs will be almost the same as 
Davidson’s
114
. His claim is that Swampman’s beliefs will be “almost as good as”
115
 a 
teletransported Replica’s beliefs would be. 
Campbell’s assertion of the similarity between ‘near-beliefs’ and beliefs is 
unsubstantiated and seems to underestimate severely the significance the externalist places on 
the relation between individual and environment. And Campbell also gives no explanation of 
the way in which Swampman’s ‘near-beliefs’ will be almost as good as a normal belief. We 
must establish first to what extent mental content is individuated externally (if at all), before 
we can make such a claim. Indeed, to state that, after we have somehow suspended the 
elements of mental content that depend on features of the environment, the remainder is a 
‘near-belief’ is to make several assumptions. We would be assuming that the remainder is 
something like a belief, that some content is narrow, and that this narrow content is what is of 
importance to personal identity. To assert that internal content gives us a ‘near-belief’ and 
then claim that a ‘near-belief’ is ‘almost as good as’ a belief is to make a claim about 
terminology and then make an assertion based on your assumed terminology. 
If Campbell can provide an argument to show that internalism about mental content is 
correct, then he could claim that Random and Replica are about equal, and also that there 
need be no causal connection between one person-stage and another in order for there to be 
survival. There are many arguments purporting to show the importance of narrow content
116
, 
and rejecting externalist claims
117
, but Campbell offers none of these. The issues surrounding 
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the individuation of mental content are various and detailed, and it is not possible to examine 
them here. 
If we could establish that externalism is at least partially correct, i.e. that mental 
content is partly individuated externally, then Random will lack the externally individuated 
mental contents of Davidson. Campbell gives no reason for his assertion that the internal 
content of a belief gives one a ‘near-belief’, and in failing to do so, leaves his argument for 
sequentialism hanging.  
 If we were to accept the externalist argument, we can deny that psychological 
sequentialism, in which there is no causal relation between two person-stages, gives us either 
personal identity or survival. Even just to survive as a number of individuals, I must be 
causally related to each of them. But without examining the details of the arguments for and 




3.5) Swampman and Replica 
Campbell’s introduction of Swampman to his argument for sequentialism draws 
attention to the differences between Davidson’s coincidental swamp replica and Parfit’s 
teletransported replica on Mars. The teletransporter does not create a replica merely by 
coincidence, but based on the psychological states that I exhibit on Earth when I step into the 
teletransporter. Parfit stresses the significance of the causal relation between Replica and me. 
For both personal identity and survival, the replica must have psychological states with the 
right kind of cause, although Parfit does not state what kind of cause is required. 
By claiming that psychological similarity is good enough for survival, Campbell 
wants to assert that I could survive as Random (or Swampman). I have examined the view 
that in order for Davidson to survive as Swampman the latter, in fact, must be causally related 
to the former. The claim being entertained is that unless Swampman’s mental states are 
causally related to Davidson’s then they will be missing at least some content. This is because 
the causal relation between Davidson’s mental states and objects in the world will fail to be 
transmitted to Swampman’s mental states, due to the fact that Davidson and Swampman are 
not themselves causally related. But if this is the case then in order to be psychologically 
similar, even, person-stages must be causally related. If this is the case, then claiming that it is 
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psychological similarity and not causation that matters in survival seems a little disingenuous, 
for it is only by having the right causal relation that we can be similar. 
As just stated, Parfit makes no commitment as to the kind of causal relation he has in 
mind, nor does he give his reasons for including the causal requirement. One way of 
understanding the requirement is that it highlights the difference between Replica and 
Random. What this would mean is that the mental states that Replica has are related to the 
environment in the right kind of way. Replica continues to have a host of beliefs about where 
I live, who my friends are, what state my dissertation is in, because I had those beliefs. And 
their content partly supervenes on me, in the past, having met my friends, found somewhere 
to live, and striven to write my dissertation. If this is what Parfit has in mind, then in lacking a 
causal connection, Swampman and Campbell’s Random both lack external content to their 





 The arguments for externalism are far from uncontroversial, but in fact Parfit can 
choose to be internalist or to be externalist about content. If he wants to claim that content 
supervenes on internal properties only, then Replica can be said to continue to have the same 
thoughts and propositional attitudes as the individual who stepped into the transporter. On the 
other hand, if Parfit favours externalism, then Replica still has the same propositional 
attitudes and thoughts as the individual-prior-to-teletransportation because their existence is 
historically based on my experiences of the world. 
As far as it is an attempt to silence the clamorous problem of reduplication, Parfit can 
remain silent on this particular debate about how content is individuated, since for 
teletransportation to work, he can retain either externalist or internalist sympathies. This 





















4.1) The Embedded Mind 
We have seen that traditional externalism does not give us any ammunition against 
teletransportation and hence against reduplication. However, there are other forms of 
externalism which have altered our understanding of the mind; the hypothesis for the 
extended mind suggests that the mind cannot always be located in the skull, but can be 
partially constituted by elements of the environment. Such a view of the mind puts pressure 
on the traditional thought experiments used in debates about personal identity which assume 
that personal identity can hold across widely different environments. Although we will find 
the appeal to embedded cognition unsuccessful in meeting the challenge of reduplication due 
to its failure to establish that for every individual that exists, his or her mind extends into the 
environment in a way that cannot be duplicated, it will be instructive to examine this approach 
in order to illuminate how questions of survival and identity can be tackled under this 
increasingly influential theory. 
 The view, in broad outline, is that the mind and cognition extend beyond the 
boundaries of the brain and the body and include select aspects of the environment. In their 
paper ‘The Extended Mind’ Andy Clark and David Chalmers set out to challenge our 
assumptions that the mental is limited to what is ‘in the head’. The claim is not that any part 
of the environment, any artefact or institution, can, on its own, exhibit cognition. Rather it is 
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the coupling of human and artefact together which make up one cognitive system
118
. Without 
the particular feature of the environment the agent has slighter cognitive capacities than when 
in conjunction with the artefact in question
119
. 
The heart of the argument is found in the parity principle: 
“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were 
it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognising as part of the 





To explain how they mean to apply the parity principle Clark and Chalmers describe three 
different examples in which a Tetris-like game is being played
121
. In one case an agent cannot 
actually manipulate the set of blocks on the screen in front of her, she can only imagine their 
rotation. In the second case the agent is playing a standard game of Tetris, and can either 
imagine the blocks rotating, or can physically press a button with her finger which then 
rotates the blocks on the screen. In the third scenario the agent has a neural implant which 
allows her to rotate the blocks on the screen as was done in the second example, but without 
any physical pressing of a button, but again can also imagine the rotation occurring since this 
‘mental rotation’ and the implant-driven rotation on the screen use different cognitive 
processes. The claim that is made is that, if we think that both methods of manipulating the 
blocks in the third case should be classed as cognitive activities, then so too should the 
physical manipulation in the second scenario
122
. In effect, if the neural implant allows us to 
perform a further cognitive operation, on top of our being able to mentally rotate the blocks, 
then every method of rotating the blocks in each case is an instance of cognition. 
 This is exactly what the parity principle tells us should be the case. If a process is 
carried out outside of the brain, but is a process which, were it to be carried out in the head, 
we would call a cognitive one, then it also should be called a cognitive process. Clark and 
Chalmers give a host of examples of ways in which cognition extends in this way. In 
‘Pressing the Flesh’ Clark describes an accountant who is proficient in the use of tables when 
she is working, and in particular copies down certain figures onto her workbook in order to 
keep them to hand as she continues to work
123
. This saves some of her internal cognitive 
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capacities which would be required in remembering which columns and rows to look to in 
order to find the figures she is using. 
 Another example of the extended mind (EM) is that of long multiplication
124
; an 
agent multiplies each digit of one number with each digit of another. By writing down the 
products of each individual calculation and summing them later, the agent can calculate 
mathematical operations on larger numbers than biological memory will permit. The claim is 
that these situations are best understood, not as simple instances of an agent using a tool, but 
as occasions of the existence of a greater cognitive mechanism incorporating brain and 
elements of the environment. Clark has described this as the “Larger Mechanism Story”
125
. 
According to the view the brain features as just an element of the larger cognitive mechanism, 
that also involves objects that common sense often suggests are merely tools. 
 Further examples given by Clark and Chalmers include the playing of Scrabble, 
language, books, diagrams and culture
126
. In a game of Scrabble the tiles are arranged and re-
arranged by a player to search for a high-scoring word
127
. Another example is the solving of 
an anagram puzzle. The agent will write the letters of the anagram in a circle in a random 
order. If this particular arrangement does not bring to mind the word, the letters can be 
rearranged, again in a circle in the hope that the changes in combination will bring some 
indication of the word being sought. Without pen and pencil the agent will usually take longer 
to solve the puzzle and will put more of a strain on her internal cognitive capacities. With 
paper and pencil she forms a larger cognitive mechanism that solves the puzzle quickly. 
 The theory of extended cognition is more plausible the more regularly an agent relies 
on a part of the environment. The case of the agent solving an anagram puzzle is less 
convincing than an accountant who frequently uses a notepad to work with tables each day. 
Even so, given that she does so only at select times, her case is less convincing than that of 
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4.2) Externalism versus Active Externalism 
 The argument is not merely that content is individuated externally, in the way that 
Putnam and Burge make the case for externalism about meaning. In their argument the 
environment is passive and need not be present when an individual has a thought with a 
certain content
128
. The force of the Twin Earth argument lies in the fact that the content of my 
beliefs has already been individuated. The meaning is grounded historically. When I talk 
about water I mean water, and when my twin on twin earth talks about water she means twin 
water because each of our meanings has been set in place by a different causal chain
129
. When 
I visit Twin Earth I may have a background belief that ‘water quenches thirst’. Unbeknownst 
to me when I am standing by a lake of XYZ, rather than H2O, but nevertheless my thought is 
not about XYZ, but H2O. It is not by being near XYZ that my belief has content, but because 
my historical learning of the word came about by instances of contact with H2O. The XYZ 
and H2O in question are not required to be present for me to have a thought about them. What 
is required is that at some point in my past I have come across H2O (or XYZ if I am from 
Twin Earth). 
 Clark and Chalmers’ view is dubbed ‘active externalism’ because the environment 
plays an active and constitutive role in the cognitive process
130
. The environment must be 
present in some way, because the larger mechanism story can only be used to describe a 
tightly coupled system in which an agent is joined with an external feature of the 
environment, and where the coupling involves a two-way interaction
131
. This is not merely an 
instance of me writing or drawing on pieces of paper which are then discarded. What has been 
written has then to affect my behaviour in some way, in the same way that internal cognitive 
processes do
132
. For the feature of the environment to partially constitute a cognitive system 
the relation between brain and object must be temporally-extended and must operate in both 
directions. It is not enough even that the paper affects my behaviour – my behaviour must 
also affect the paper in turn. The relation between the two must be mutually interactive so that 
it is difficult to separate ‘input’ from ‘output’. 
 
 
                                                 
128
 Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 9 
129
 Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 9 
130
 Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8-9 
131
 Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8 
132
 Clark & Chalmers 1998, p. 9 
 45 
4.3) Extending Mental States 
Clark and Chalmers expand their argument by claiming the parity principle should 
also be applied with regard to mental states
133
. So, if some part of the environment functions 
in a way that, if it were contained in the head, we would label the entire process as the holding 
of a belief, then that part of the environment is part of the belief-holding system
134
. They 
describe a man suffering from Alzheimer’s disease whom they name Otto
135
. Otto cannot 
remember new information which he learns using biological memory, so when he comes 
across something that he thinks will be useful to himself later on he makes a note of it in a 
notebook which he carries with him at all times. On learning the address and directions to the 
museum Otto writes them down in his notebook. When he decides at a later date to pay a visit 
to the museum he refers to his notebook and follows the instructions he finds therein, 
successfully making his way to his destination. Clark and Chalmers argue that Otto’s 
notebook should not be considered merely as a tool which Otto uses occasionally, but as part 
of a belief-remembering system that includes Otto
136
. By carrying around his notebook Otto 
has a host of dispositional beliefs about where things are and how to carry out certain actions. 
Because Otto acts on the contents of his notebook in the same way he would act on an internal 
belief, and because it is easily accessed, and the content is immediately endorsed by Otto 
when he reads the information it contains, Otto’s notebook should count as part of his belief 
system
137
. Thus Otto’s notebook is unlike my occasional use of a notebook because of the 
fluidity and frequency with which he uses it, the fact that he has become coupled with it in a 
two-way interaction, and because it has become integrated into his ongoing cognitive and 
behavioural activity. 
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In applying the parity principle to Otto’s notebook, Clark and Chalmers claim that 
artefacts can form part of the larger belief-holding system. When they compare Otto to an 
agent whose beliefs are stored in biological memory they write: 
“In both cases the information is reliably there when needed, available to 





Otto and a ‘normal’ agent Inga act in the same way when each decides to go to the 
museum
139
. Inga consults her internal belief about the location of the museum and follows the 
information contained therein. So too, when Otto makes the decision to go to the museum, he 
consults his notebook and follows the information on the page. Clark and Chalmers claim that 
the alternative explanation of Otto’s actions – a decision to go to the museum combined with 
a standing belief that directions to the museum are in his notebook and the relevant inscription 
on the page of the notebook – is unnecessarily complex in the same way that it is unnecessary 
to explain Inga’s acting on a belief because of her background beliefs about the reliability or 
content of her memory
140
. 
 In order to avoid indiscriminate seepage of the mind into the environment Clark and 





 of the availability of a feature of the environment, as well as the automatic 
endorsement of the information stored in the environment
143
. This means that my mind does 
not extend to all objects around me at any time, unless I am reliably and directly coupled with 
them, and that I automatically endorse the information stored in the environment. This should 
answer an obvious criticism: the objection that the EM leads to a grotesque expansion of the 
mind and cognition into every part of the environment around us
144
. If the argument for the 
EM is only thought to apply in situations to which the above conditions apply, then we can 
avoid the worry that the mind will be considered to absorb all and everything around it. 
 Another example of the way cognition extends into the environment involves the way 
that in hospital wards a chart that records the results of observations made on a patient is 
hooked onto the patient’s bed. A patient’s temperature, blood pressure, respiration, 
blood/sugar levels, oxygen saturations, pain scores and levels of consciousness are recorded 
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on these charts over time. Whilst working in a busy hospital ward a doctor will often leave 
and return to a patient’s bedside several times over. On each occasion she might assess the 
patient’s condition using the statistics on the patient’s observation chart. Instead of 
remembering the patient’s condition in a detailed series of figures ‘in the head’, the doctor 
will refer back to the chart to recall the previous recordings she has made. As such the 
observation chart is easily accessed (by the patient’s bed) and reliable, as well as being 
automatically endorsed by the doctor. The doctor and observation chart act together as a 
remembering system. Alone the observation chart is not a memory of the previous condition 
of the patient, but also the doctor without the chart cannot recall the patient’s condition either, 
given that she has had to see a series of other patients since her last visit to this patient’s bed. 
When coupled together the doctor and observation chart are an integrated system. I am not 
claiming that it is not the doctor that, after making a decision, cures the patient. My claim is 
merely about the doctor’s increased ability to recall certain figures and statistics when 
coupled with the observation chart, than without it. This should be understood not as an agent 
using a tool, but as an instance of the existence of a larger cognitive mechanism incorporating 




4.4) The objection from intrinsic content 
 Adams and Aizawa have objected to the argument for the EM, claiming that whilst 
they accept the parity principle, they think there are no actual instances of the mind extending 
into the environment
145
. Their reasoning is that, whilst the EM is logically and nomologically 
possible, all instances of cognition are ‘in the head’
146
. This is because, they claim, the ‘mark 
of the cognitive’ is intrinsic content
147
. So, whilst it is possible that cognition could extend 
into the environment, or what they call ‘transcranialism’ might be possible, they in fact 
defend a “contingent intracranialism about the cognitive.”
148
 Rather than interpreting the use 
of pencil and paper in working out accounts as the operations of a larger cognitive mechanism 
incorporating human and artefacts, Adams and Aizawa opt for the common sense view that 
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my internal cognitive processes interact with the features of the environment, in the same way 
that using a hammer is an example of tool use
149
. Use of the hammer could be explained as 
the operations of a larger physical system, but the natural boundaries between body and 
hammer give us more explanatory power than viewing the whole as a single entity. 
 In accepting the parity principle, Adams and Aizawa accept that being inside the head 
is not what makes a process cognitive
150
. To claim this would be to beg the question against 
the EM. However, they claim that in setting about finding out what the ‘mark of the 
cognitive’ is, we will discover that all real world cognitive processing happens to be found in 
the head
151
. The argument for this is that, according to Adams and Aizawa, “a first essential 
condition on the cognitive is that cognitive states must involve intrinsic, non-derived 
content.”
152
 Whilst the meanings in written and spoken language seem to be derived from the 
representational capacities of cognitive agents, the cognitive states of these agents, it is 
argued, are underived
153
. Adams and Aizawa claim that this underived nature of the content of 
our cognitive states, makes the content in some way intrinsic, in a way that external symbols 
are not
154
. Any representational capacity that a feature of the environment has, they argue, is 
non-intrinsic, and thus cannot be claimed to take part in real cognitive processing. 
 Clark has pointed out that it is difficult to get a grasp on what is meant by ‘intrinsic’ 
when it comes to content
155
. Susan Hurley also argues in ‘Varieties of Externalism’ that 
language can alter our cognitive capacities, building upon what exists and enhancing it
156
. 
When a child learns to speak, her language learning may build upon existing mental content, 
which it might be possible to claim is intrinsic
157
. Nevertheless, “further mental contents also 
build on language, so that their content is presumably also derived.”
158
 Despite this fact we do 
not hesitate to think of this ‘in the brain’ content as cognitive
159
. 
 Another argument Hurley offers against the objection from intrinsic content involves 
imagining the building of a robot, the content of whose ‘cognitive’ states has all been derived 
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from the creator’s mental states
160
. According to Adams and Aizawa the robot would in fact 
have no cognitive states as such. However, we can run a similar argument according to which 
the content of every human’s mental states is derived from a divine creator who has made the 
world and all the creatures in it
161
. If this were so, we would also have to deny that any of our 
cognitive capacities are in fact cognitive. We would lack the ‘mark of the cognitive’ also. 
 Unless we are prepared to reduce what is cognitive to the small portion of mental 
content that is in no way derived (in the case of learning language as a child)
162
, then we 
should abandon Adams and Aizawa’s claim that mental content must be intrinsic. This is 
something Adams and Aizawa hint at themselves, when they admit that “it is unclear to what 
extent each cognitive state of each cognitive process must involve non-derived content.”
163
 If 
this is so, then even if all cognitive processing requires some non-derived content, we can still 
claim that the EM is an actual occurrence in the world. Clark and Chalmers do not seek to 
argue that notebooks, speed dialling programs on telephones
164
, or tiles in Scrabble games are, 
on their own, cognitive systems. It is only when reliably coupled with a cognitive system that 
these elements of the environment extend our cognitive powers. 
 
 
4.5) Applying the Extended Mind to personal identity 
 In Being There Clark mentions an anecdote from a friend working with Alzheimer’s 
patients in Washington
165
. The friend reports how she discovered that the patients had 
organised, labelled and systemised their homes so as to be able to aid their biological memory 
which was beginning to fail. They had labelled photographs and kept all the household 
objects that they needed regularly in plain view. When taken into a care home for assessment 
the patients had largely degraded cognitive abilities, yet when in their own environments they 
could look after themselves and recall people and events. This seems to be an excellent 
example of the ways in which the mind extends into the environment. Being taken from their 
habitual environment might even be enough, I want to suggest, to alter their identity. 
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 This idea is poignantly described by Primo Levi in his record of the treatment of 
Jewish people by the Nazis in the 1940s in If This is a Man
166
. Levi writes: 
“Then for the first time we became aware that our language lacks words to express 
this offence, the demolition of a man. In a moment, with almost prophetic intuition, 
the reality was revealed to us: we had reached the bottom. It is not possible to sink 
lower than this; no human condition is more miserable than this, nor could it 
conceivably be so. Nothing belongs to us any more; they have taken away our 
clothes, our shoes, even our hair; if we speak, they will not listen to us, and if they 
listen, they will not understand. They will even take away our name: and if we want 
to keep it, we will have to find ourselves the strength to do so, to manage somehow 
so that behind the name something of us, of us as we were, still remains. 
We know that we will have difficulty in being understood, and this is as it should be. 
But consider what value, what meaning is enclosed even in the smallest of our daily 
habits, in the hundred possessions which even the poorest beggar owns: a 
handkerchief, an old letter, the photo of a cherished person. These things are part of 
us, almost like limbs of our body; nor is it conceivable that we can be deprived of 
them in our world, for we immediately find others to substitute the old ones, other 
objects which are ours in their personification and evocation of our memories. 
Imagine now a man who is deprived of everyone he loves, and at the same times of 
his house, his habits, his clothes, in short, of everything he possesses: he will be a 
hollow man, reduced to suffering and needs, forgetful of dignity, and restraint, for he 
who loses all often easily loses himself. He will be a man whose life or death can be 
lightly decided with no sense of human affinity, in the most fortunate of cases, on the 
basis of a pure judgement of utility. It is in this way that one can understand the 
double sense of the term ‘extermination camp’, and it is now clear what we seek to 




 Levi suggests that the stripping away of the clothes and hair, as well as their other 
possessions, of the Jewish people forcibly taken to Auschwitz is an extermination of the 
person. This removal of personal identity then leaves the Nazis in a position where they need 
not think of these humans as anything more than ‘pieces’, and whose lives hold no intrinsic 
value. By stripping them of their possessions and taking them from their homes the Nazis 
have reduced them to something they can consider beneath them, whom they don’t have to 
pay attention to. Levi’s account captures the way in which what makes us the people we are 
can supervene on features of the environment and culture. The argument for the extended 
mind suggests that familiar objects and habits form part of the supervenience base for our 
long-term dispositional beliefs and attitudes, which are constitutive of our identity. 
 If we return to Parfit’s original explanation of psychological continuity we can recall 
that what was considered significant to personal identity was our memories, beliefs, desires 
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and intentions. To at least two of these kinds of mental states we can apply the argument for 
EM – beliefs and memories. Specifically, I want to argue that psychological continuity should 
not be understood merely as what goes on ‘in the head’, but as something that can, at times, 
incorporate elements of the environment. Psychological continuity does not always require 
just the continuity of the brain, but sometimes might also require the continuity of a notebook, 
or some other element of the environment. 
 So far I have concentrated on beliefs and memories, but it might be possible to think 
of intending to do something as requiring one to be tightly coupled with the environment. I 
might I programme my mobile phone to remember someone’s birthday, or to remind me to do 
something. When I set an alarm I intend to be woken up at a certain time. It might be as well 
to think of myself and the alarm clock as a larger mechanism. The alarm’s ringing in the 
morning will result in my switching it off and, hopefully, getting up as I intended. When I 
switch it off the alarm will cease ringing and will not ring again until the next morning. 
Alternatively, if it has a ‘sleep’ function, meaning that when I press the ‘sleep’ button it will 
cease ringing for a short duration before ringing once again, the alarm and myself interact in 
ensuring that I will, eventually get up. There may be better examples than this, but it is not 
obvious that intentions cannot also be included in our theory of the extended mind. If they are, 
then this gives us more reason to think of personal identity as requiring some continuity of 
environment. 
 
4.6) Teletransportation II 
 If you recall, Parfit argues that the possibility of teletransportation creates a 
significant problem for us, namely reduplication. If my psychological states can be 
reduplicated, and if personal identity just consists in psychological continuity, then we have to 
decide how we are going to deal with situations in which an individual has, effectively, split 
in two. In the face of this problem, Parfit differentiates between personal identity and 
survival. Identity, being a one-one relation, requires uniqueness, whereas survival can hold 
between me and any number of future persons. I can be reduplicated many times over and in 
every case I will have survived. 
 The motivation for this claim was the possibility that I (A) might step into a 
teletransporter which then malfunctions. Instead of destroying my body on Earth before the 
replica (C) is created on Mars, my body on Earth (B) is left intact. I (B) continue to exist on 
Earth and Replica (C) has been created on Mars – there seem to be two of me. Parfit has 
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rejected the possibility that bodily continuity might count as part of our criterion for personal 
identity. Bodily continuity matters only in so far as it ensures psychological continuity. Parfit 
has already accepted that psychological continuity can be transmitted through a signal and 
‘uploaded’ as it were, to a new body, so B has no greater claim to personal identity with A 
than C does. According to Parfit’s understanding of the problem, this does seem to be a case 
of a person fissioning in two. But, identity is one-one – it cannot hold between both A and B 
and A and C. If this were true then B and C would have to be quantitatively identical, for 
identity is a transitive relation. We know this is not the case: B and C are distinct individuals. 
So, Parfit adds to his criterion of personal identity that there can be no ‘branching’, that 
personal identity can only hold uniquely, but allows that these cases should be understood as 
examples of survival. I survive in so far as I have everything I would need for personal 
identity excepting uniqueness. 
 What is more, Parfit claims we should not care about personal identity, but survival 
instead. When he describes the malfunctioning teletransportation thought experiment he 
describes how the teletransporter has not destroyed my body but has left my heart fatally 
damaged. I can expect to live for only a few days more, so, Parfit asks, how do I feel about 
my circumstances? He argues that because everything I care about (my psychological states) 
have survived in the instantiation of C on Mars, I should feel almost as good as I would in 
ordinary survival. Whilst B on Earth will soon die, Parfit thinks this scenario is nothing like 
ordinary death because of the existence of C. Recall that in the original teletransportation 
experiment when A is destroyed and C created, Parfit is only too happy to call C identical 
with A. If I think I am identical to C in this situation, then in the second experiment now in 
question I must be at least as contented as I would be in a case of ordinary survival. 
Now, the argument for the Extended Mind may give us reason to object to Parfit’s 
appraisal of this situation. Specifically, in the scenario presented there may be some way to 
tell the difference between B and C. B does have environmental continuity in a way that C on 
Mars does not, so there may be some beliefs and memories that C does not have, which B 
continues to have. In such a scenario, B is more psychologically continuous with the person 
who stepped into the teletransporter than C, so according to Parfit’s criterion as I have 
adapted it, B is identical to A, and C is not. Even in such a scenario we can still have personal 
identity, and do not need to rely on survival, because there is no real branching. 
On the view I am proposing the conditions placed on the EM, those of the reliability 
and directness of the availability of a feature of the environment, as well as the automatic 
endorsement of the information stored in the environment, should also apply to personal 
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identity. For a feature of the environment to count as part of the person the coupling between 
human and artefact has to be exceptionally close. 
 What is significant is that we need not be aware of how we do extend into the 
environment in order to do so. If our intuitions about where our minds end can be misleading, 
then so too can our intuitions about what is necessary for personal identity. 
 Andy Clark has written about the possibility that the extension of the mind could have 
some effect on us as persons. His response is at times positive, but is on the whole mitigated. 
In Being There he admits that: 
“taken to extremes, this seepage of the mind into the world threatens to reconfigure 
our fundamental self-image by broadening our view of persons to include, at times, 




A similar attitude is found at the end of ‘The Extended Mind’ where Clark and Chalmers 
write that: 
“My dispositional beliefs, for example, constitute in some deep sense part of who I 





However, more cautiously, Clark also advises that: 
“An alternative (and, I think, equally acceptable) conclusion would be that the agent 
remains locked within the envelope of skin and skull, but that beliefs, knowledge, 
and perhaps other mental states now depend on physical vehicles that can (at times) 




Clark’s understanding then is that whilst the agent must be thought of as the human animal 
within skin and skull, some mental states can extend into the environment. And it is my 
contention that personal identity should be understood in terms of mental states, the holding 
of some of which requires a coupling between agent and environment. Whilst Clark does limit 
agents to the body and brain, his claim is not inconsistent with mine about identity. 
 Caution, though, may prove to be a sensible approach, not least because the 
application of the EM to the cases of teletransportation I have described above comes up 
against a significant set of problems. 
 
 
                                                 
168
 Clark 1998, p. 214 
169
 Clark & Chalmers 1998, p. 18 
170
 Clark 1998, p. 218 
 54 
 
4.7) Otto’s notebook and the teletransporter 
 Clark and Chalmers argue that there is, in principle, no reason why the cognitive 
mechanism may not incorporate two different agents
171
. In the case of an especially close 
couple, the memories of one might serve as storage to the other – when the one cannot recall 
the name of a friend, the other is at hand to inform him. The idea is that together the two form 
a cognitive system that remembers the name. Without his wife, the husband cannot remember 
the name, but with her, he is able to. Does this mean that one person can be constituted by two 
different humans at a time? To choose this conclusion would be misleading; it is not the case 
that two humans constitute one person, but that what constitutes the husband includes some of 
the mental states of his wife. 
 However, a more significant objection that my proposal faces is that Parfit might re-
imagine his thought experiment to include Otto’s notebook. We can imagine that Otto decides 
to take a trip to Mars, and to do so enters the teletransporter. Our teletransporter has been 
developed to take account of the extension of the mind into features of the environment, and 
so Otto’s notebook, which he always carries with him, is replicated on Mars just as Otto 
himself is. So the individual who steps out of the teletransporter clutches a notebook with the 
same facts and addresses that Otto’s notebook on Earth contained. Whilst this notebook 
contains information about how to get to museums on Earth, Otto is well aware of this. He 
can continue to use it to jot down new information he thinks he will need, and will still refer 
to it, say, if his friend telephones from Earth to ask him where a particular restaurant they 
both like is situated. 
 It might seem improbable that we can enter the teletransporter with all the elements of 
the environment that are incorporated in a series of larger cognitive mechanisms, but it is 
going to be difficult, if not impossible, to show that doing so is logically impossible. To do so 
would require an argument proving that in every case of teletransportation (a) the individuals 
holding of psychological states in part incorporates elements of the environment, and (b) these 
elements of the environment cannot be taken into the teletransporter and replicated. 
 Parfit’s decision to make psychological connectedness suitable for psychological 
continuity only if at least half of the psychological states of one person-stage are in common 
with half of the states of the neighbouring person-stage does seem to be arbitrary. However, 
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even if we do not specify the number of psychological states that are required to be the same 
for continuity, it is not obvious that the greatest proportion of our psychological states require 
an element of the environment to be present in order to exist at all. And it would be 
counterintuitive to claim that total psychological connectedness is required to be the same 
person. I do not hold many of the beliefs I held five or ten years ago, yet I maintain that I am 
the same person. The appeal of psychological continuity is that it allows for some alteration in 
psychological states as time passes without the loss of identity. However, if some 
psychological transience is acceptable, usual even, then we can allow that the psychological 
states dependent on the close coupling of human and environment are lost whilst identity is 
maintained. If Otto were not particularly dependent on his notebook, then the failure of it 
being replicated on Mars would not affect his personal identity.  
 We might still want to argue that if Otto is replicated on Mars, but his body is not 
destroyed on Earth, and moreover the teletransporter cannot replicate his notebook, then Otto 
on Earth afterward is more psychologically continuous with Otto before, than Martian Otto is 
with Otto before. But this does not give us a response to the possibility of the key feature of 
the environment being replicated. Nor does it deal with the objection that the mental lives of 
some individuals might not extend into the environment at all. Given that the coupling 
between human and artefact is supposed to be exceptionally close (the artefact must be 
reliably to hand, there must be a two-way interaction between the two, and the artefact must 
be involved in causal processes in the same way internal mental states are) it is unlikely that 
persons do seep unconsciously into all around them. Whilst we need not be explicitly aware 
of the item and oneself making a larger cognitive mechanism, we are likely to be aware of 
some dependence on the article in question. The more I use my diary to keep a record of what 
I have to do in the near future, the more I am aware of its importance to me. That I do not 
consider myself dependent on a multitude of things around me, exhibits my intuition that in 
fact, if the EM story is true, it is so to a somewhat limited extent. If it cannot be shown to be 
widely applicable in everyday life, then there is little hope of it aiding us in a defence of our 
account of personal identity against cases of reduplication. Even an account of the EM that 
treats humans as substantially extended into their environments does not guard against the 
logical possibility of reduplication. Unless we can establish that all individuals extend into the 
environment in such a way that cannot be duplicated, then the argument for the EM has 
turned out to be unhelpful. 
 Nonetheless, the argument for the EM does suggest that large bits of our identities 
can be interestingly and unexpectedly dependent on features of our local environment. Whilst 
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it fails to undermine teletransportation, active externalism has shown us a way of 
understanding personal identity that is ignored in traditional debates about personal identity. 
The psychological properties we think are important for personal identity can be constituted 
to a surprising extent by the environment. As we will see in the next chapter, they are also 








































The Extended Mind hypothesis is not the only class of externalism worth examining 
in an analysis of personal identity. By introducing arguments for embodiment we begin to see 
the brain and body as intimately connected in the processing of, for example visual 
information. Like traditional and active externalism, this view of the mind will not furnish us 
with a way to avoid reduplication altogether, but it does help us narrow cases of reduplication 
to the more far-fetched science fiction type thought experiments, rather than the perhaps more 
scientifically plausible brain transplant. 
 Given that the normal cause of person-stages being connected to one another involves 
bodily continuity as well as psychological continuity I will examine certain views in 
philosophy of mind that emphasise embodiment rather than the more traditional ‘Classical 
Sandwich’
172
 of sensing, thinking and acting (as separate and sequential processes). If we find 
that embodiment is significant in either the content or enabling of our mental lives then 
psychological continuity might require more than continuity of brain cells. I will examine two 
different accounts of embodiment and the ways in which it plays a role in constituting our 
experiences of the world and the thoughts we have. 
There are a range of ways in which embodiment is thought by some to play a 
significant role in either our experience of the world or our thoughts about the world. I will 
examine those presented by Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë, and by Lawrence Shapiro because 
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their accounts are the most fully formulated and their approaches are characteristic of the 
embodiment trend in the literature. 
O’Regan and Noë present a view according to which perception of the world is 
constituted by the exercise of knowledge of the ways in which movement and action will alter 
the nature of our sensory stimulation. Our embodiment is significant because it is our 
particular physical structure that enables a certain range of movements, and therefore lets us 
know various things about the world. Our physical structure determines the effects that 
movements will have on sensations, such as the particular way our retinas are curved. A 
radically different body would result in a radically different phenomenology of experience. 
Shapiro argues against the possibility that the human mind could be contained within 
any kind of body. He argues that the brain cannot be casually separated from the body 
because the interface between brain and body is complex, rather than simple. In addition he 
claims that particular details about our embodiment are such as to contribute to the way we 
experience the world, and so contribute to the phenomenology of our experiences. 
 
 
5.2) O’Regan and Noë 
In ‘Varieties of Externalism’ Hurley outlines four different forms of externalism. 
There are two forms of ‘what’-externalism: content and quality. In contrast ‘how’-externalism 
makes claims about the vehicles of content and quality. ‘What’-content externalism concerns 
the nature of the contents of mental states such as beliefs and desires
173
. This kind of 
externalist explanation we examined in chapter three, and found it to be of little use to us 
against reduplication of personal identity. ‘What’-quality externalism is concerned with the 
phenomenological aspects of human experience
174
. The claim is that the experiential feel is, in 
some sense, partially external to the traditional concept of the perceiver as locus of inputs and 
outputs. 
‘How’-content externalism, also known as enabling externalism and vehicle 
externalism by Hurley, is the view that the enabling of mental processing can be at least in 
part external to the human
175
. It is the view that cognition extends beyond the traditionally 
conceived boundaries of the brain or the body into the environment, as discussed in chapter 
four. This kind of externalist explanation did not give us a way of resisting the possibility of 
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reduplication. And lastly, according to ‘how’-quality externalism the phenomenological feel 
is also due to external factors, rather than merely what is experienced being external to the 
agent
176
. O’Regan and Noë’s account fits into the ‘how’-quality externalism category outlined 
by Hurley. 
Unlike the standard view, according to which visual experience is the activation of 
internal representations
177
, O’Regan and Noë have argued that phenomenology is best thought 
of as “exploration of the world that is mediated by knowledge of what we call sensorimotor 
contingencies.”
178
 By sensorimotor contingencies O’Regan and Noë are pinpointing the ways 
in which different kinds of movement will affect patterns of sensory input. 
They do not deny the existence of cortical maps or that these give us information 
about the word, but they do claim that their mere existence does not explain what perception 
is.
179
 Whilst standard views of perception posit detailed internal representations, the activation 
of which is supposed to explain how we see, O’Regan and Noë question this account because 
it fails to explain visual consciousness
180
. 
To explain this something else is needed. As well as filling this gap, O’Regan and 
Noë claim that their enactive approach to perception also explains another problem, a problem 
that Hurley and Noë call the “intramodal” explanatory gap
181
. The challenge is to understand 
why certain experiences, say of two difference colours (red and pink) are more alike than the 
experience of red and the experience of black
182
. A related problem has been labelled by 
Hurley and Noë as the “intermodal” explanatory gap
183
. The problem is in understanding why 




 Their claim is that we differentiate so easily between experiences from different 
modalities because “the structure of the rules governing the sensory changes produced by 
various motor actions” differ over different sensory modalities
185
. Whilst we may not be 
aware of these rules themselves, our brains do register the different ways in which action and 
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movement will produce different perceptual arrays
186
. So, for example, our visual apparatus 
brings about one set of (perhaps an infinite number of) sensorimotor contingencies – the 
movements of my eyes as they survey the room bring about changes in the way the retinal 
image is displayed
187
. Blinking is also significant in the way we visually perceive the world, 
whereas, blinking does not affect our auditory awareness in the way that moving one’s head 
to the right or left might
188
. So, facts such as these give us a reason for the differences in 
phenomenology between the different sense modalities:  
“a crucial fact about vision is that visual exploration obeys certain laws of 
sensorimotor contingency. These laws are determined by the fact that the exploration 




But what does the account of sensorimotor contingencies have to say about our 
experiences themselves? If the specific laws of sensorimotor contingency for each modality 
explain the differences between the sense modalities, then these laws must be responsible for 
the experiential feel itself. O’Regan and Noë claim that “the visual quality of shape is 
precisely the set of all potential distortions that the shape undergoes when it is moved relative 
to us, or when we move relative to it.”
190
 So perceiving a square shape involves the 
knowledge of how my actions and movements, or the movement of the object, might affect 
the shape I see. If I move to the right a little way, then I will no longer see an object with four 
right-angles, but with two obtuse angles, and two acute ones. O’Regan and Noë give this 
account of what they call visual attributes, such as shape, colour and size. There are therefore 
sensorimotor contingencies relative to the attributes of an object, and there are also 
sensorimotor contingencies that are “induced by the visual apparatus.”
191
 The sensorimotor 
contingencies that are so induced by our sensing apparatus are those that lead us to 
differentiate between seeing, hearing, smelling, touching and tasting as described above. The 
sensorimotor contingencies that depend on the objects (as well as those dependent on our 
sensory apparatus) themselves are those that give rise to the specific phenomenology of 
seeing a green tree, or hearing a piercing whistle. 
Now, these sensorimotor contingencies themselves are not what visual perception is: 
for that something else is required. In order to be a visual perceiver, O’Regan and Noë 
propose that as well as these laws of sensorimotor contingency dependent on apparatus and 
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object to be in place, the individual must be “actively exercising its mastery of these laws.”
192
 
In order to see we must make use of our knowledge in planning actions and thinking about 
what to do
193
. The difference they wish to identify between visual perception and visual 
awareness can be brought out by considering the difference between perceiving a landscape 
and seeing a tree in the centre of the landscape. I do not notice the details of all the plants, 
flowers and trees in the landscape, and I do not see the colour of the sky to the far left and 
right of me. When I look at a specific tree though I can see some of the details of the branches 
and leaves, and I can make out the fruit hanging from those branches. By combining my 
knowledge of the laws of sensorimotor contingency relevant to myself and the objects in front 
of me, with my abilities to think and act I become visually aware of the tree
194
. 
As mentioned earlier, my knowledge of the laws of the sensorimotor contingencies is 
practical and is not propositional in nature
195
. I am not aware of the laws as laws, but this does 
not mean the brain does not register the difference between a red object and a green object via 
its sensitivity to such laws. In doing so we experience one object as red and the other as green. 
Our sensation of seeing a red object is explained by this practical knowledge of the ways in 
which changes in the object would result in changes in our experience. It is in this way that 
O’Regan and Noë hope to close the explanatory gap. The hard problem of consciousness is 
thought to be the problem of explaining why it is we experience the world at all. If sensing the 
world is concerned with pick-up of information, then why is it that we have phenomenology 
associated with our information gathering? The hard problem is often described as the 
problem of explaining qualia – the phenomenal properties of an experience, as opposed to the 
intentional qualities of an experience
196
. A related problem (the explanatory gap
197
) is that of 
explaining conscious experience in purely physical terms. The existence of phenomenal 
qualities has led many a philosopher to be dualistic in their treatment of the mind and 
consciousness. O’Regan and Noë think that, in fact, the explanatory gap is the result of a 
category mistake
198
. They deny that experiences are states, suggesting they are ways of acting 
instead; since qualia are supposed to be properties of states, if there are no such states, then 
there are no qualia to be explained. By re-categorising experiences they do not intend to deny 
that we have phenomenological experiences, but they do deny that our experiences are states, 
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and so they reject the possibility that our experiences have qualia. For them the qualitative 
character of our experiences is an aspect of the activity of seeing
199
. If phenomenology really 
is just the knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies, then we have answered the hard problem 
of perception. 
 It is the specific details of our embodiment that contribute to our perceptions of the 
world. So, the argument might go, different kinds of embodiment would give us different 
perceptual experiences. Obviously different kinds of movement affect what we see. When I 
look to the side I no longer see the computer screen in front of me, but instead become aware 
of the open window and the garden outside. This is a trivial way in which my movement 
affects my visual experience: trivial because the movement is instrumental in affecting my 
perception
200
. On the enactive approach to perception the claim is that seeing itself just is the 
practical exercise of knowledge of how movement of the body, and knowledge of our 
particular sensing apparatus, will effect a precise perception. 
 O’Regan and Noë give the example of seeing a straight line
201
. As I gradually look 
along the length of a straight line I will see still more of the line in my line of sight. However 
if I move my head up or down, the straight line will move out of my foveal vision
202
. If my 
visual apparatus were different, for example if my eyes were in a different place, or if I had 
one eye rather than two, then the ways such movements would affect my experience would be 
different. The sensorimotor contingencies that depend on our perceptual apparatus would be 
different as a result, which would hence mean that the phenomenology of our experiences 
would be different. 
Another useful example of the way our bodies play a role in our experiences is found 
in Noë’s book Action in Perception. Noë writes: 
“Suppose you are in an airplane. At takeoff it will look to you as if the front of the 
plane, the nose, rises or lifts up in your field of vision. In fact, it does not. Because 
you move with the plane, the nose of the plane does not lift relative to you. No 
lifting, strictly speaking, is visible from where you sit. What explains the illusion of 
the apparent rising of the nose? When the plane rises, your vestibular system detects 
your movement relative to the direction of gravity. This causes it to look to you as if 
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Noë takes this as an example of the way that our visual experience depends “on idiosyncratic 






In The Mind Incarnate Shapiro argues against the multiple realizability of the mind, 
as well as what he calls the separability thesis (ST). According to many philosophers, the 
mind could be realised in a number of different ways, and not just by human brains: it is 
multiply realisable
205
. In opposition to this Shapiro claims we should advocate the ‘Mental 
Constraint Thesis’, according to which “there are few ways to realise the mind”
206
. In 
conjunction with this, he argues against the ST and in favour of the ‘Embodied Mind Thesis’ 




 In making his argument in favour of EMT, Shapiro claims that the interface between 
brain and body is too complex to allow them to be separated easily. Shapiro takes his cue 
from John Haugeland, who claims that we should understand components of an entity as the 
parts that are “relatively independent and self-contained.”
208
 Shapiro follows Haugeland in 
arguing that if we understand components in this way, then the body and brain are not easily 
and simply separable. He cites Haugeland’s example of the division of a television
209
. If we 
divide a television into a series of cubes, irrespective of where the various components are 
then we end up with a series of parts which are difficult to replace. Each cube is likely to have 
complex interfaces with its neighbours because the television has not been designed around 
the combination of cubes. Instead, if we imagine removing a resistor in a television we will 
find the task relatively simple. We need not worry about the material our replacement is made 
from, nor whether it works exactly as its predecessor did. As long as the inputs and outputs 
match the previous resistor, we can be sure that our replacement will function within the 
television. Shapiro says that: 
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“Through its narrow interface, the resistor is able to influence other components in 





The resistor, therefore, is a prime example of a component. Shapiro’s argument is thus, that 
the interface between brain and body is not narrow, but wide
211
. The brain is not isolated from 
the behaviour of the body, and so cannot be considered a mere component of the human. As 
such, dividing the brain and body is like dividing a television into arbitrary cubes. In doing so 
we in fact divide components in half, so that they can no longer operate. Alternatively, if the 
body and brain are easily separated, and the brain can continue to function apart from the 
body, then it would seem that the brain should be considered as a component – as isolated 
from the body in its own operations. The question therefore is how Shapiro establishes that 
the interface between brain and body is wide. 
Our line of investigation will be to look at the argument for EMT, which suggests that 
embodiment is particularly significant in the continued operations of the mind. If we establish 
that the ‘interface’ between brain and body is in fact complex, then it seems that the brain and 
body are not separable in the sense that Shapiro rejects. And if we do so, we may be able to 
establish the necessity of the body in our psychological continuity. 
 
5.4) Separability and the Embodied Mind 
According to Shapiro, the Separability Thesis (ST) tells us that a mind very like, if 
not exactly alike to a human mind could exist in something very different from a human body. 
And in opposition to this, Shapiro prefers the Embodied Mind Thesis (EMT), according to 
which “minds profoundly reflect the bodies in which they are contained.”
212
 They do so to the 
extent that from the kind of mind we encounter, we can make a series of assumptions about 
the body in which it is contained. Specifically he argues that the way our bodies process 
information about the world is directly involved in perception of the world
213
. Our 
psychologies, he thinks, would be dramatically different if we had different kinds of 
perceptual apparatus. 
 For Shapiro the ST can be divided into two, possibly coincident, groups of thought – 
one, that the mind is best understood as a computer program or formal system which can be 
implemented in any kind of ‘hardware’. Someone who espouses this kind of view is labelled, 
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by Shapiro, as a supporter of ‘body neutrality’
214
. By thinking of the mind as simply a formal 
system, much like a game of chess, then we can imagine different kinds of instantiations of 
the mind. In the same way that a game of chess can be played on a wooden set with physical 
pieces, or alternatively on a computer, the mind could be instantiated in vastly different 
entities than human bodies
215
. The second line of thought is called ‘envatment’ by Shapiro: a 
proponent of envatment will also be someone who believes human cognition should be 
understood as the filling in the ‘sense-think-act’ sandwich
216
. For these philosophers, mind is 
entirely separable from perceptual activities, and from action – the brain could literally be in a 
vat, and this would not affect our ability to think because interfaces between mind and 
perception and between mind and action are clearly defined
217
. 
 It is worth pointing out here that envatment provides no argument against theories of 
embodied cognition, because successful envatment presupposes that the inputs and outputs of 
Hurley’s ‘Classical Sandwich’ are both present to the envatted brain
218
. Hurley has pointed 
out that this does not prove that the mind is in fact meaningfully separable from the body, but 
only that if envatted, the inputs and outputs would have to be of an appropriate nature.
219
 But, 
if the mind only responded to inputs of a certain type, i.e. a certain visual input as received 
from a creature with two eyes, then we would need to ensure our input mimicked the kind of 
visual input expected. Despite this, Shapiro’s arguments in favour of embodiment are 
important because it illustrates why brain-swapping cases do not give us personal identity. We 
cannot, it will turn out, use embodiment to defend our account of personal identity from the 
possibility of reduplication, but we will be able to re-evaluate the possible cases of 
reduplication, and narrow them down to a certain type of duplication involving body as well 
as brain. 
 For Shapiro, if we can show the unlikelihood of envatment and body neutrality then 
we can show that the ST is also unlikely, which will thus lead us to favour the EMT
220
. If the 
connections between mind and body cannot be reduced to a simple series of inputs and 
outputs, and also if there are strong constraints on the kind of body a creature can have, based 
on the kind of mind they have, then the mind cannot be clearly separated from the body.  
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 One example he gives as proof of embodied thought is of visual perception (and we 
can see a similarity to O’Regan and Noë’s account of sensorimotor contingencies, although 
there are significant differences). Shapiro claims that “the human mind is intimately tailored 
to the human body.”
221
 So, my two eyes present the world to me in a different way than 
having one eye or five eyes would, which means also that the kind of mind I have processes 
visual perception in a two-eye kind of way
222
. By having two eyes my visual system can 
calculate the relative depth of different objects by a certain kind of processing. So, Shapiro 
explains that “the brain uses the fact that the images appear at different co-ordinates on each 
retina to calculate the relative depth of the objects. But – and this is the crucial point – the 
brain’s processing makes use of disparity information from two eyes.”
223
 If my brain was 
transported from my body to a new ‘host’ body with one eye then my brain would not be able 
to process the visual information presented to me, and would be unable to judge the relative 
depth of various objects. To explain his point Shapiro imagines trying to steer an aeroplane to 
a safe landing without any knowledge of aeroplanes but with the aid of a submarine 
instruction manual
224
. The information about operating a submarine is useless to you if you 
find yourself in an aeroplane. So too, inhabiting a body with ten limbs, four eyes and three 
ears would provide one with no information about the world if your brain can only process 
information garnered using two eyes and ears and four limbs. So, Shapiro thinks, “humanlike 
bodies will have humanlike minds”
225
, having the former is required for having the latter. 
 Another example Shapiro gives is that of hearing: the spatial difference, locations and 
angle of a creature’s auditory apparatus will affect the kind of information that is presented to 
the brain, which will in turn require different processes for sounds to be heard
226
. The 
placement of human ears on each side of the head gives us certain auditory information about 
the world that is then processed in a specific human-body related way. 
 Shapiro takes these ideas to show that: 
“psychological processes are incomplete without the body’s contributions. Perceptual 
processes depend on and include bodily structures. This means that a description of 
various perceptual capacities cannot maintain body neutrality, and it also means that 
an organism with a non-human body will have nonhuman visual and auditory 
psychologies.”
227
 (author’s italics)  
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5.5) The Problem 
It is not clear that sensorimotor contingencies or Shapiro’s concern with embodiment 
will help us in dealing with the problem of reduplication in personal identity, for O’Regan and 
Noë, and Shapiro deal in phenomenological experience, and it is not obvious that 
phenomenology has much to offer an account of personal identity. Personal identity is often 
thought to consist in continuity of mental states, and possibly in bodily continuity, but is not 
thought to require continuity in the way our experiences feel. This does not, of course, mean 
that our account of personal identity could not be broadened to include continuity of 
phenomenological experience. 
At most we may be persuaded that continuing to experience the world in the same 
way is significant enough for personal identity, and that this continuation requires continued 
embodiment. However, there is nothing in our teletransportation thought experiment that 
counters this claim. When the replica is created on Mars the body is created as an exact copy 
of the body I had on Earth. And presumably the instantiation of my entire psychology will 
give me a good working knowledge of how my movements will affect my perceptual 
experience. Parfit is careful to state that the replica produced on Mars has an exact copy of my 
body on Earth. This ensures that the way I experience the world will not have altered due to a 
change in sensorimotor contingencies. 
 By stipulating that teletransportation involves an exact reduplication of mind and 
body, Parfit has ensured that these arguments for embodiment do not have any significance. 
When I am teletransported to Mars I lose one body on Earth, but a new, qualitatively identical 
one is created on Mars. Parfit does not need to defend the view that minds can be instantiated 
in robots, or that minds need not exist in close coupling with a certain kind of body. At no 
point do I exist without a body of the form that my original body had, and made of similar 
matter also. Parfit does not even suggest that my psychological states are uploaded to a 
mechanical replica, who looks like me but has a core of steel and wires. He is careful to state 
that my replica looks just as I do, and presumably does so all the way in. Replica on Mars is 
not superficially the same, but the same in total. 
 So, on Mars I have two ears and two eyes as I do on Earth. There is no reason to 
suppose that visual and auditory, not to mention any other perceptual modality’s, information 
is not processed in the way a human body is on Earth. We may well draw the line at 
considering Replica a human, given that she was not born on Earth, and did not grow up from 
a baby to become an adult. Whatever kind of a creature we call Replica, she is certainly 
 68 
human-like both in the matter from which she is made, and in the way she processes 
information about the world. Shapiro’s arguments can only show that human-like minds 
require human-like bodies, not that there is any necessity that for a human mind to operate it 
must be made from the same physical matter. 
 The way that embodiment does affect our assessment of personal identity involves 
thought experiments about brain transplants. When Brown’s brain is supposed to be placed 
into Robinson’s body, the example of Brownson is supposed to illustrate our intuitions that it 
is the brain, in other words the mind, that is important in personal identity, and not the rest of 
the body. However, our reaching this conclusion relies on us being able to make sense of 
Brownson and to believe that he continues to have the same beliefs and other mental states as 
Brown had, and perhaps also the same phenomenology. But if we include phenomenology as 
part of our criterion of personal identity, then we may not be able to imagine Brownson as 
having any phenomenology, or at least, as having a severely altered phenomenology. 
 It is not the case that the brains of Brown and Robinson could be swapped from 
patient to patient without disrupting the kinds of possible experiences that each has, as these 
will be dependent on bodily features. The sensorimotor account of visual experience suggests 
that it is in exercising our knowledge of the laws of sensorimotor contingency that we 
perceive, and some sensory contingencies relate to our visual apparatus, as well as being 
determined by objects in the world. A change in our sensing apparatus will therefore change 
the nature of the laws of sensorimotor contingency, at first rendering us without 
phenomenology as we are unable to make sense of the new contingencies, and later once we 
have become accustomed to a new set of contingencies, giving us a different phenomenology. 
A difference as seemingly insignificant as my eyes being slightly further apart could therefore 
have significant effect on the phenomenology of my experiences. And O’Regan and Noë 
make clear that there are perhaps an infinite number of contingencies which must be taken 
into account. 
 Similarly, Shapiro’s work suggests clearly that differences in the detail of the 
structure of the body, such as the spacing between the ears, or between the eyes, has 
resounding affects on the brain’s ability to process the information it receives. It is not merely 
important that my body is the same in general structure, but the specifications of body parts 
are as significant in our ability to perceive. 
 It is because of this that teletransportation can give us reduplication, but Brownson in 
fact should not count as a case of personal identity. Once Brown’s brain has been transplanted 
into Robinson’s body, our resultant Brownson is at first unable to have phenomenological 
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experiences. Only once he can exercise a knowledge of the new set of sensorimotor 
contingencies will he have perceptions, and these perceptions will be different in quality to 
Brown’s phenomenological experiences. 
 
 
5.6) Embodiment and Personal Identity 
The reason that arguments for embodiment have not given us any help in our defence 
of accounts of personal identity from the problem of reduplication is that embodiment only 
argues for the significance of the kind of body an individual requires, and not for the 
importance of the continuity of the same physical matter. 
Returning to Shoemaker’s Brownson thought experiment, we can see that our 
intuition that Brownson is Brown does not capture the significance of the body itself in our 
experiences. When Brown’s brain is placed in Robinson’s body there is some reason to think 
that Brownson will have the memories, intuitions, desires and beliefs that Brown had. 
However, whilst Brownson has Brown’s brain and presumably connected to this, Brown’s 
propositional attitudes, Brownson and Brown do not have the same body. Brownson would 
eventually have altered phenomenology, which would exhibit one kind of continuity that is 
missing. The lesson we should learn from the embodiment paradigm is that it is brain and 
body continuity that is necessary for psychological continuity: the brain alone will not suffice. 
As creatures with brains and bodies, both have a role to play in our identity. When we 
examined O’Regan and Noë’s and Shapiro’s claims about embodiment we saw the 
significance they place on continuity of the structure of the body. According to the 
sensorimotor account of visual perception, it is the specific laws of contingency that arise 
from the particulars of one’s body which are required for one to have any visual perception. 
My perception is the exercise of my knowledge of these laws, so a difference in the nature of 
the contingencies, will result in a change of phenomenology. A change in body will result in a 
different set of contingencies operating, and this will have the consequence first of my lacking 
knowledge of these contingencies, and later of my phenomenology differing to the 
phenomenology I experienced with the earlier body. It is for this reason that the kind of body 
we have is significant in personal identity. 
There are other ways of describing the brain transplant thought experiment which 
would surmount this obstacle that we have attempted to place in the way of duplication. Parfit 
imagines that his brain is divided in two, into right and left hemispheres, and then whilst one 
hemisphere is placed in the body of one of his identical triplet brothers, the other is placed in 
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the body of the other triplet
228
. In this case the body of each triplet is qualitatively identical to 
the other two. 
Each hemisphere is responsible for different tasks, but it might seem reasonable to 
think that with only the left hemisphere of the brain we could not learn to perform tasks 
normally associated with the right hemisphere, and vice versa
229
. Patients with brain damage 
to one hemisphere, leaving them with the use of only the other hemisphere, can continue to 
live and continue to be the same person
230
. In Parfit’s imagined brain transplant, our intuitions 
will be that each resultant triplet has as much claim to be Parfit as the other. And in this case, 
each resultant has the same kind of body as Parfit, has as much of his brain as the other, and 
presumably is as psychologically continuous with Parfit as the other. To be identical with 
Parfit they would have to be numerically identical with each other. So, they cannot be the 
same person, yet this might seem to be a legitimate example of duplication. 
In fact, our intuitions about the case rest on the assumption that we have independent 
seats of consciousness in each hemisphere
231
. For split-brain patients there may be some cases 
where one hemisphere learns to perform cognitive functions that it could not before, but these 
can be explained by there still being some sub-cortical connections between hemispheres, 
even though the main cortical connections have been severed. Thus, the conclusion that one 
hemisphere has learnt the functions of the other is not the only one, or the most obvious one. I 
will leave it as an open question here as to how we should interpret the evidence from 
commisurotomy patients (patients in which the corpus callosum has been severed) as it is a 
complex issue, but I think it is important to point out that Parfit’s assumptions about the case 
are far from trivial. Regardless of this, Parfit’s understanding of the brain transplant thought 
experiment has much in common with that of teletransportation in which body and mental 
states are both qualitatively identical. In an attempt to avoid the issues surrounding the 
interpretation of consciousness in commisurotomy patients I will focus on avoiding 
duplication through teletransportation, rather than brain transplant. 
 
 
5.7) Teletransportation III 
 So, in both teletransportation and our altered brain transplant the resultants meet our 
criteria of personal identity. For psychological continuity we need the same kind of brain, and 
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we need the same kind of body. To ensure that duplication cannot occur there seems to be 
only one possible addition to our criterion: continuity of brain matter. Whilst we saw in 
chapter one that most body cells are replaced several times over the course of a lifetime, the 
cells of the brain remain through most of one’s life. Could they therefore be themselves 
significant in personal identity? By adding continuity of brain matter as a stipulation we 
would ensure that teletransported individuals could not be the same person as an earlier 
individual, and hence ensure that duplication could not occur by teletransportation. Moreover, 
the possibility of brain’s being divided into two hemispheres, both with a seat of 
consciousness and psychological continuity with the earlier individual does not seem to be a 
viable option in light of the discussion above. Could brain continuity therefore be the missing 
part of our criterion? 
 Continuity of brain matter seems to be implausible as part of our criterion because we 
have no real motivation to include it. What matters to us is our mental states, and not how 
they are realised. I refer again to Parfit’s analogy with the prosthetic eye: whilst the patient’s 
new eye is not made of carbon-based matter, we can still call it an eye and we still think the 
patient can see by using the computer and glass lens machinery. Although brain cells are not 
replaced over a lifetime, this does not prove that they could not be replaced either with new 
biological cells, or silicon-based neuronal implants. The brain is significant only in so far as it 
ensures psychological continuity, so plays a part in our criterion only because it might be the 
right kind of cause for two person-stages being psychological connected. We have little, if 
























As long as personal identity is understood in terms of psychological continuity it is not 
obvious that we will be able to avoid the problem of reduplication. Unless we posit some 
special substance that continues to exist as long as we do, then duplication will always be an 
issue.  
 However, we have learnt important lessons about psychological continuity which 
have led us to alter our criterion of personal identity and our criterion of survival. Whilst it 
may not be possible to avoid the possibility of an individual being duplicated, we have to 
rethink the easy assumptions which are made about the brain and body in thought experiments 
about duplication. 
 In my dissertation I have examined three kinds of externalist argument that have led 
us to conclusions about the significance of a causal link between person-stages, and of the 
importance of the environment and of the body in continuing to be the same person. 
 Traditional arguments about externalism suggest that unless the right causal 
connection between reference and referent has been established, an individual’s mental state 
has no content. If a person-stage is merely psychologically similar to another, in other words, 
there is no causal connection between the two, then it seems as though the mental states of the 
later person-stage will not have the right causal connection to objects in the world, rendering 
his mental states without content. So, in our criterion of personal identity there must be a 
causal connection between two person-stages in order for them to belong to the same person. 
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As for active externalism, we discovered that, whilst in principle the extended mind 
presents us with a way in which persons may extend into the environment around them, 
unless we claim that they always do so, and in such a way that cannot be duplicated, then 
things like teletransportation might still be able to occur successfully. What this means is that 
the teletransporter must be able to duplicate any significant features of the environment in 
order for there to be a relation of identity between Replica and the original person on Earth. 
 Lastly I examined embodiment. Whilst embodiment provides a series of reasons for 
thinking that the body is irreducibly involved in the operations of the mind, this will not 
ultimately aid us in our defence of psychological continuity from reduplication. Examples of 
reduplication often involve duplication of the body as a whole, and not just the brain, or one’s 
mental states in isolation from any kind of physical instantiation. Whilst duplication of one’s 
mental states in the body of another human might have a large affect on our identity as a 
particular person, duplication of the mental combined with a qualitatively identical body does 
not. 
 Thus, unless we do posit some one thing that cannot be duplicated in the way that it 
seems both psychology and bodily form can be, our account of personal identity cannot avoid 
this central problem: personal identity relies on the uniqueness of the relation between one 
person-stage at time t1 and another at time t2. 
 Duplication remains a problem for our account of personal identity, and therefore 
Parfit’s motivation for preferring survival to personal identity as what should be of concern to 
us remains. Nevertheless, in light of the theories of the embodied and embedded mind, the 
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